

AA000005546



UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY

THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

E. BOUTROUX

M





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

/ EX LIBRIS
C. K. OGDEN

THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

AND OTHER ADDRESSES

BY

ÉMILE BOUTROUX

MEMBER OF THE FRENCH INSTITUTE
PROFESSOR OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF PARIS

TRANSLATED BY

JONATHAN NIELD



LONDON

DUCKWORTH & CO.

3 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C.

1912

All rights reserved.

P
2194
P5 B4

PRÉFACE

LES trois conférences dont M. Jonathan Nield me fait l'honneur d'offrir aujourd'hui au public une traduction anglaise, où se remarquent ce scrupule d'exactitude et ce souci de clarté et d'élégance qui distinguent tout ce qu'il écrit, portent sur des sujets que je n'ai pas choisis moi-même, mais qui m'ont été indiqués comme susceptibles d'intéresser les personnes devant lesquelles j'étais appelé à parler. J'ai traité ces sujets à mon point de vue ; j'ai cherché, comme d'ailleurs j'y étais invité, à marquer des orientations, plutôt qu'à fournir des théories détaillées ; en sorte que, dans ces trois études, sans lien extérieur entre elles, le lecteur discernera aisément un fonds commun, constitué par les quelques idées générales à la propagation desquelles je souhaiterais de contribuer.

La pensée qui me guide pourrait être rendue par ce texte célèbre : *ἐγὼ ἐφύτευσα, Πολλὸς ἐπότισεν, ἀλλὰ ὁ θεὸς ἡΰξανεν* . . . *θεοῦ γάρ*

ἔσμεν συνεργοί. “ J’ai planté, Appollos a arrosé, mais c’est Dieu qui a donné la croissance . . ., car nous sommes les collaborateurs de Dieu.” Texte dont je rapprocherais volontiers ce passage du “ Discours de la Réformation de l’homme intérieur,” par Jansénius : “ Tenez pour une maxime constante que tout notre pouvoir vient de Dieu . . ., quoique vous ne laissiez pas d’agir de toute votre puissance et avec tous les efforts qui vous sont possibles.”

L’œuvre humaine, dans l’ordre philosophique, c’est la science ; l’action divine, c’est l’inspiration, l’activité de l’esprit, l’intuition.

Or il faut désormais que le philosophe renonce à chercher la vérité directement, par l’intuition pure, sans traverser les systèmes de concepts élaborés par la science positive. Que nul n’entre dans le temple, s’il n’a passé par l’initiation nécessaire, s’il n’a formé sa raison à la pratique des sciences !

Mais, d’autre part, il est vain de prétendre extraire purement et simplement, des résultats de la recherche scientifique, une réponse, positive ou négative, aux questions que soulève la philosophie. Interrogée sur l’esprit qui l’anime, la lettre, prise en soi,

demeure muette : *σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾶ*. Bien plus, la science étant essentiellement fabricante d'homogénéité, celui qui fait profession de ne croire qu'à la science nie a priori la possibilité même de tous les objets dont s'occupe la philosophie ; car ceux-ci : conscience, sentiment, action, individualité, beauté, perfection, etc., impliquent tous une certaine valeur attribuée aux notions transcientifiques d'hétérogénéité, de discontinuité, de liberté.

De cette relation, chaque jour plus accentuée, entre la philosophie et la science il suit que l'on ne saurait maintenir le dualisme radical, l'indépendance mutuelle garantie par l'interposition d'une cloison étanche, qui était généralement postulée au siècle dernier : l'œuvre philosophique ne peut s'accomplir que par une collaboration intime des savants et des philosophes.

La question qui se pose est, dès lors, de savoir comment la science, qui semble être un tout, et l'intuition, qui, elle aussi, apparaît comme un tout, peuvent se concilier et s'unir en un tout plus réel, qui les embrasse l'une et l'autre.

Comment, en s'appuyant sur la science,

penser en philosophe ; et comment, en cherchant la satisfaction de besoins qu'ignore la science, demeurer en accord avec cette dernière : tel est le problème.

Ce problème ne saurait se résoudre en séparant la question de méthode et la question de doctrine, et en posant, soit celle-là avant celle-ci, comme font les intellectualistes, soit celle-ci avant celle-là, comme font les pragmatistes. Méthode et doctrine sont ici solidaires. La philosophie trouve sa voie en marchant ; et elle détermine cette voie par sa marche même. L'esprit, en l'homme, pense sous la sollicitation des faits ; et il comprend les faits à mesure que sa pensée progresse.

Se connaître, ainsi, de plus en plus distinctement, comme un milieu entre l'effet et la cause, selon le mot de Pascal, et, par là même, relier entre eux ces deux extrêmes : cette tâche, qui, à l'heure actuelle, s'impose particulièrement, est celle-là même, au fond, que, de tout temps, s'est assignée la philosophie. Et, à ce titre, la philosophie a joué et continuera à remplir le rôle, indispensable pour qui réfléchit, d'intermédiaire entre la science et la religion.

Collaborer, si faiblement que ce soit, à

cette œuvre, excellemment humaine, c'est, peut-être, pour l'individu qui passe, se donner une chance de concevoir quelques pensées qui durent.

ÉMILE BOUTROUX

PARIS, 6 *avril*, 1912.

PREFACE (*translation*)

THE three addresses here presented . . . treat of subjects which I myself did not choose, but which were suggested to me as likely to interest the persons before whom I was invited to speak. I have discussed these subjects from my own point of view; I have endeavoured—as indeed was demanded of me—to indicate tendencies, rather than to furnish detailed theories; hence, in these three studies, devoid as they are of any external bond, the reader will quite easily discover a common groundwork, constituted by certain general ideas in the propagation of which I am anxious to share.

The principle which has guided my thought may be conveyed by those well-known words : ἐγὼ ἐφύτευσα, Ἀπολλὼς ἐπότισεν, ἀλλὰ ὁ θεὸς ἡύξανε· . . . θεοῦ γὰρ ἐσμεν συνεργοί· “I planted, Apollos watered; but God gave the increase. . . . For we are God’s fellow-workers.” Beside these words I would set the

following passage from Jansen's "Treatise on the Reformation of the Inner Man": "Regard as unalterably true the saying that all power comes from God . . ., even though you do not cease to act with the utmost vigour and strenuousness of which you are capable."

Human work, in the philosophical sense, is the pursuit of scientific knowledge; divine action is inspiration, spiritual activity, intuition.

Now philosophers must, henceforward, renounce the attempt to arrive at truth in a direct manner, *i.e.* by means of intuition alone, without traversing the conceptual systems elaborated by positive science. Let no one seek to enter the temple unless he has undergone the necessary initiation, unless he has framed his reason in conformity with the scientific standard!

But, on the other hand, it is idle to pretend that we can quite simply extract, from the results of scientific investigation, a positive or a negative reply to the questions raised by philosophy. Interrogated with regard to the spirit it conceals, the letter, as such, remains silent: *σεμνῶς πάντα σιγᾷ*. Yet again, science being essentially fashioned on the principle of

homogeneity, he whose profession of belief is limited to science, denies *a priori* the very possibility of all the objects with which philosophy is concerned ; seeing that these latter, viz., consciousness, feeling, action, individuality, beauty, perfection, etc., presuppose—all of them—a certain value attributed to the trans-scientific ideas of heterogeneity, of discontinuity, of freedom.

From this relation, daily more accentuated, between philosophy and science, it follows that we cannot maintain the radical dualism—the mutual independence guaranteed by a sort of bulkhead interposition—which was generally assumed in the last century : the work of philosophy can only be carried on through the willing collaboration of scientists and philosophers.

The question which we have now to face resolves itself into asking how science which appears to be a whole, and intuition which appears to be a whole also, can be fused and united so as to form a yet more genuine whole, which shall embrace them both.

How, if we rely upon science, are we to think philosophically ; and how, if we aim at satisfying needs that she ignores, can we still adhere

to the scientific standpoint? That is the problem given us.

This problem cannot be solved through separating the question of method from the question of doctrine, and through making the former precede the latter as the intellectualists do, or the latter precede the former as the pragmatists do. Method and doctrine are here conjoint. Philosophy finds her way as she advances; and she determines that way by her actual advance. The human mind thinks under the solicitation of facts; and it understands facts in proportion as its thought progresses.

To recognise ourselves thus, with ever-increasing clearness, as midway between effect and cause (adopting Pascal's phrase), and, by virtue of this very recognition, to bind together these two extremes: herein we discern not only the special task of the moment, but one which, fundamentally, has been assigned to philosophy from earliest days. And so, philosophy has played and will continue to play the part—indispensable as it must appear to thinking men—of intermediary between science and religion.

To assist, be it ever so slightly, in this pre-

eminently human undertaking is, perhaps, for the transient individual, to allow himself the opportunity of conceiving a few thoughts that may endure.

ÉMILE BOUTROUX

PARIS, *6th April* 1912.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN .	1
II. MORALITY AND RELIGION . .	28
III. THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO THE SCIENCES	100

“O streaming worlds, O crowded sky,
O Life, and mine own soul's abyss.”

WILLIAM WATSON.

I

THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

I

I HAVE to speak to you ¹ about the Beyond that is Within ; and I ask myself, first of all, why I have been invited to speak of the Inner Beyond, rather than of the Outer Beyond. Assuredly, the first impulse of the mind is to seek the Beyond in some region situated Without, *i.e.* outside us, outside our world. The subject to be discussed would, seemingly, be much clearer and more open to methodical investigation if the Outer Beyond were in question.

In fact, that is what we usually mean by “the Beyond.” It will be admitted, for instance, that outside this world, *i.e.* outside the visible or sensible world, there is another,

¹ This address was originally delivered as one of a series of lectures dealing with “the Beyond” (*l’Au-delà*) ; it appeared, afterwards, in the bi-monthly magazine, *Foi et Vie*, December 1911.—TRANSLATOR’S NOTE.

2 THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

of which the reality can be grasped, whether in itself, or in its influence upon the phenomena of our world. Even nowadays, many assertions relating to such a Beyond are sustained, not only by uncritical observations, but by systematic laboratory experiments. We could thus, in treating of this Outer Beyond, appeal to actual experience—scientific experience, more precisely—as a test.

Unquestionably, the verifications that are reported to us in this matter are very startling.

But further reflection leads us to ask if what is demonstrated, what can be demonstrated by outward observation, is really what we are seeking. We reach, by this track, phenomena which, maybe, are strange, extraordinary and even unique in their kind. Are we just here in presence of a veritable Beyond? The very phenomena which, in our own day, seem the simplest and the most ordinary, began by being, for man, strange and miraculous. Are we to regard the thunder, the peculiar virtue of springs, the exuberant vegetation of the vine, as due to the influence of a Beyond? Do such things

imply a supernatural intervention contrary to the laws of nature ?

Science, when she is confronted by abnormal phenomena, can only choose between two courses : either she must endeavour to bring back these phenomena within the sphere of known laws—it was in this way that the ascent of the balloon was made to illustrate the law of gravity ; or she must modify her enunciation of laws, so as to bring it into conformity with the facts—in this way the law of Mariotte, at one time affirmed as universally true, came to be no longer deemed true except within certain limits. For the scientist, indeed, it is the laws, mere artificial abstractions, which ought to be adapted to facts, not the facts which ought to be adapted to laws. And, for a mind viewing things from such a standpoint, there is no fact, however strange, which can prove the existence of a veritable Beyond. By “strange” is meant unexplained, not inexplicable. The word indicates a problem, not a solution. Perhaps some will say : If, in spite of all this, we do actually succeed in communicating with the dead, have we not, then, a genuine experimental demonstration of the reality of a

4 THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

Beyond ? Yes, doubtless, in a sense ; a life beyond this life is implied. But is this sufficient to establish the Beyond of which we are in search ? Is the life of the butterfly following the life of the chrysalis the realisation of that Beyond ?

It can very well be that, in pursuance of natural laws alone, the present life may be succeeded by another life, and that this may be a phenomenon as natural as the life that we are now experiencing. How are we to recognise a veritable Beyond in another life if the latter is analogous to actual life, and is merely the mechanical persistence of it ?

Nothing that falls under our senses, nothing that is susceptible of coming within our sensible experience can be, properly speaking, a Beyond. But, in the very things that we observe so closely as to pierce even the core of their essence, is there not something which deserves the name of Beyond ?

Let us consider, for instance, space, time, number, physical causality, all of which are, so to speak, the stuff of which our world is made. Is not the Beyond indirectly given in these elements of things ? Assume a determinate space A. Along with this particular

space we are obliged to grant surrounding spaces, and so on to infinity. In the same way, one moment A is only given in connection with an anterior moment B and a posterior moment C, and so to infinity. The same thing holds good of number. Take the number 4: it is fairly defined as $3 + 1$ or as $5 - 1$. Any number whatsoever allows at once both the number which precedes and the number which follows. Hence any number whatsoever allows at once the entire series of numbers. Similarly, physical causality presents any phenomenon whatsoever as conjoined with the infinite totality of phenomena. Thus, is not the infinite, *i.e.* a veritable Beyond, at the very heart of our world?

You will recall Pascal's wonderful pages in connection with this subject: they have been wellnigh equalled by certain utterances of Herbert Spencer.

However little, however great may be the quantity of material that we consider, this quantity is an infinitely great or an infinitely little in relation to the degree of littleness or to the degree of greatness that the case allows.

Still, is it certain that even this Beyond is

6 THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

the object of our search? Certainly, it is a Beyond, but a Beyond that is homogeneous with regard to the immediately given. The instant which is going to follow is, in itself, like the present instant and like the past instant. Phenomena, in so far as they are phenomena, determine one another because they are all of the same nature. It is an endless repetition : *Eadem sunt omnia semper*. Now, we are trying to find just the contrary. We look for a Beyond which veritably outstrips nature, which surpasses it qualitatively, and not merely quantitatively.

Such a Beyond is not attained, it cannot be attained in any given being, either directly, or indirectly.

But can it not be inferred? Has not reasoning this very power of enabling us to assert the existence of things that we neither see nor touch, but which are implied by those that come within our grasp?

It was the main, essential object of the Kantian criticism to demonstrate the impossibility of such reasoning. It is, most certainly, to be expected that man should draw the inference from nature to the supernatural, from time to eternity, from the finite

to the infinite, from the relative to the absolute. But when we analyse the reasonings through which we have been able to rise in this manner, from the term given to the term inferred, we find them illegitimate.

These reasonings are of two kinds : positive or negative.

The positive reasonings consist in searching for the conditions of given reality, and in trying to show that the indispensable condition is the existence of a Beyond incommensurable with the given—of an infinite for instance, which the given, as actually constituted, cannot realise. However plausible these reasonings appear, they are without positive value, for they simply extend to the relation of phenomenon to noumenon connections which are only verified or verifiable with respect to the relations of phenomenon to phenomenon. Such reasonings incontestably furnish an example of arguing in a circle.

The negative reasonings consist in proving that, the world being what it is, there is no reason against our supposing, beyond its limits, the existence of another world, endowed with such and such properties. The formula

8 THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

in this kind of reasoning is : why not ? Why not, in truth ? Usually, the opponent confronted by this question can make no reply. But he does not own himself vanquished on that account. How many wild fancies we should have to admit, if we were obliged to accept as true every assertion that we could not refute ! I cannot convict of error him who would have me believe that at this very moment there is, on a planet revolving around Sirius, an individual occupied in presenting, before an audience similar to this one here, just such a discussion as I myself am maintaining. To show cause for admitting a thing, it is not enough that there is no reason for not admitting it ; we must have a positive reason for admitting it ; and we have just seen that the reason offered in this case, however plausible may be the claim to deduce it from given conditions in accordance with the laws of logical reasoning, is illusory.

Therefore, the existence of an Outer Beyond can neither be apprehended, directly or indirectly, nor inferred by virtue by any reasoning. But is an Outer Beyond the only Beyond that we can conceive ?

II

Poetry, religious literature and life offer us the idea of a Beyond that is quite different.

Do you remember those magnificent words of Goethe : " Alas ! alas ! Thou hast shattered, with thy destroying hand, the splendid heaven which illuminated, protected, and vivified our world. It crumbles, it falls asunder. We cast its ruins into the inane, and mourn over the beauty that has vanished. Mighty son of earth, take courage ; the outer beyond has dissolved, but build a yet more glorious beyond, build it in thine own bosom ! "

May not this fragment from Goethe be regarded as in some degree analogous to the celebrated passage in St Augustine's *Confessions*, wherein he relates the final conversation that he had at Ostia with his mother ? Together they are seeking the Beyond ; after surveying the wonders of earth, they raise their eyes heavenward. Not even there do they find what they seek.

" For," says St Augustine, " we can mount still higher, if we carry our thoughts toward the inner side of our being. We thereby

10 THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

reach our souls, and, passing beyond them, we penetrate to the region of unfailing fertility."

And this is but the fulfilment of the Gospel teaching: *ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐντὸς ὑμῶν ἐστίν* (the kingdom of God is within you).

It was, you know, Pascal's dominating idea that man goes beyond man infinitely.

Last of all, let me quote the motto which the famous writer, Maeterlinck, noticed over an ancient mantelpiece in Bruges, and which he adopted: "Yet more is to be found in me."

Perhaps if we look into our own selves, if we seek a Beyond, no longer without, but within, we shall have more chance of success than we had during our search for an Outer Beyond in the world of the senses, of the imagination, and of spatial measure.

And at first glance it would seem as if what is called religious experience, a mode of knowledge that has so greatly engaged the attention of contemporary thinkers, would be capable of supplying such a Beyond. In the religious experience of a St Paul, of a St Augustine, of a Luther, of a St Theresa, of a Pascal, does not man, on this inner side of his nature,

come into touch with a greater and more perfect being than himself, *i.e.* with a genuine Beyond ?

It must, indeed, be allowed that religious experience has real value, not only from the standpoint of the individual who undergoes it, but from the critical and philosophical standpoint. On that very account, however, it must contain something other than experience properly so-called.

Religious experience as such, be it ever so real and irresistible, is not immediately worthy of faith. It is dependent, in fact, on our temperament, on our education, on our studies, on our beliefs, on our pre-conceived notions. The same impressions, in different consciousnesses, will not provoke the same experience. Which of these various experiences are we to regard as meeting the truth ?

In reality, in spite of the idea of immediate and simple knowledge that the word experience conveys, there are in religious experience, as in ordinary experience, two elements : firstly, an emotion, a state of soul ; secondly, an interpretation. When I say—"God has spoken"—I have, on the one hand, meant inwardly verbal expression ; on the other

12 THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

hand, it is this expression that I attribute to God, regarding him as its author. Now the same phenomenon would be otherwise interpreted by a person who did not share my ideas on the subject of God and of his dealings with creation generally. I have not, really, the intuition of God and his manner of speech. What I call my religious experience is the combination of an intuition and of a concept.

Moreover, it is the concept which characterises the experience as religious. Its value as religious experience depends upon the value of the concept, and this concept, do what one will, cannot be reduced to an intuition pure and simple. Religious experience, as such, can therefore offer us a Beyond, but it cannot guarantee that Beyond as true.

In the last few years, however, since 1886 mainly, the endeavour has been made, as much by experience as by reasoning, to establish the existence in us, beyond the definite self of which we are conscious, of a self reaching indefinitely beyond the threshold of that very consciousness. This self, greater than the ordinary self, has come to be known under the name of the *subliminal self*. Apparently, if its existence is clearly estab-

lished, it does indeed give us the Beyond which we are seeking. Is this really so?

The subliminal self is, in itself, a capacity : that of entering into relation with certain beings, with certain powers, which our senses, which our conscious self cannot grasp. What, in reality, is the value of this self? It depends on the worth of the beings with whom it enters into communication. But does the fact that these beings are inaccessible to our senses suffice in itself to make them superior to those that our senses perceive? Why, for instance, should the spirit of a dead person be superior to the spirit of that same person as it was in the period of its terrestrial life? It has been told us that Aeschylus and Dante recited to Victor Hugo some verses composed by them for his special benefit. These verses, spoken in French and beautiful besides, recall, without any manner of doubt, Hugo's own verses. The hypothesis of the subliminal self, even if it be justified, leaves us still asking whether that which is beyond our individual and actual self surpasses it radically, or is another being analogous to our self—is only that very self, forgetful, as it may chance, of its identity. While this

14 THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

theory presents, undoubtedly, the possibility of a Beyond, it does not offer one that is immediate.

And yet, notwithstanding all that has been said, it really does seem that geniuses of every type, be they scientific, artistic, political, or religious, have genuinely enlarged and given dignity to the human consciousness; and that they have, accordingly, experienced inward fellowship with a Beyond, some portion of which has penetrated, through their agency, to our world.

Shall we try, since neither observation pure and simple nor even psychology admit of our forming a well-grounded opinion, to submit the question to an examination of the strictly philosophical kind? Perhaps philosophy, amongst thinking men, may prove to have its legitimate and necessary place between fact and belief.

How, with this object in view, ought we to proceed? What method ought we to follow in order to treat this question of the Inner Beyond philosophically?

One of the first precautions to be taken is to guard ourselves against defining and determining *a priori*, in quite unalterable

terms, that which we are endeavouring to find. This rule—always a useful one—is specially imperative here, seeing that the object at stake, if it is really in existence, surpasses not only in degree, but also in nature, all those objects of which we have clear perception. To put the matter exactly, we are inquiring if there is no more in us than we can see or envisage. Therefore, of the nature of this object we have only, *a priori*, an idea that is more formal than comprehensive, more akin to a feeling than to a concept strictly so-called. Assuredly, a reply presupposes a question, but the question ought not to prejudge the reply; question and reply ought gradually to determine one another, reciprocally.

A second point, very important here, arises entirely through our proceeding with the help of concepts, since without concepts there is no thought. This point may be stated as follows: we must be careful not to imprison ourselves in the world of concepts, but rather to avail ourselves of them for the purpose of analysing, understanding, and fathoming life itself, in its fullest extent, as much on the practical as on the speculative side. For a

16 THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

Beyond, if there really is one, must be something else than a concept. All concepts are, undoubtedly, to be regarded as following one pattern. They are elements altogether homogeneous, which the mind seeks to arrange systematically. Only when we come to the order of life, of being that exists in and for self, do we find ourselves in presence of that veritable novelty, of that radical difference which the term Beyond suggests.

Let us, then, consider human life from the standpoint that interests us.

As soon as we study humanity with care, we find that a common trait characterises all its actions, all its longings, all its perceptions : the pursuit of something, not only different, but superior—the endeavour to outstrip itself.

Human action, be it ever so lowly, aims at producing something that mechanical forces alone would not have realised, *i.e.* at *creating* in some fashion. The infant, even, delights in contradicting nature, in imposing its fancies upon things, in destroying them to prove its power, in turning them topsy-turvy, in giving them grotesque shapes to convince itself of creative ability. It amuses itself in dis-

torting the very names, the very words of language. The average man and the man of genius, the sinner and the saint are all alike bent on changing things, on forcing them—in conformity with certain notions of novelty and beauty—into a mould that, left to themselves, these same things would not assume. They make nature serve as the material for something which they imagine as superior, viz., art.

The same holds good in regard to human longing. It leads, instinctively, to the infinite, to the unrealisable, to the impossible. This is shown by the fact that even its short-lived satisfaction only provides it with fresh eagerness and impels it toward higher ends. Children ask for the moon, men for love, for happiness, for justice. And, at bottom, this instinct is by no means absurd, for, in earnestly craving the impossible, we render it in some degree possible. On all sides, those who take for their motto : *ab actu ad posse* are the men who show themselves able ; those who frame their conduct on the contrary maxim which prescribes the limiting of action to power, show themselves less and less able.

But is there not in man one faculty, at least,

which does not seek the Beyond, which only finds satisfaction in denying it, in maintaining that it does not exist, viz., the intellect ?

Science is the special achievement of the intellect ; and science stands for universal identification. To know is to identify. To explain is to reduce, to assimilate the unknown to the known, to identify them. No Beyond is possible, seemingly, in the scientific region. Nature, for the scientist, excludes mystery *a priori*.

A seductive argument certainly, illusory perhaps. The starting-point in every intellectual process is perception, apprehension of a real object, the acquisition, by the mind, of something distinct from itself. Now, when we analyse this perception, we see therein an illustration of the mind's capacity to pass beyond given reality.

A perception is not something simple : we distinguish three elements in it.

There is, in the first place, an intuition, *i.e.* a certain impression undergone by the mind, in contact with the given object.

There is, secondly, an element which cannot be reduced to the first, which is of an altogether different nature : a concept. We

cannot perceive or grasp an object if we have not previously in the mind some mould wherein to cast it : to know is to know again, *i.e.* to recognise. Concept is not less indispensable to perception than intuition. A very simple proof of this can be given. When we hear a foreign language spoken, if we do not know that language, we distinguish nothing—we merely perceive a noise. But if we understand, we discern a thousand shades of meaning, we become aware of sounds that are definite and varied. Concept enables us to go beyond intuition.

But let us take a closer look at this. The mould or concept which pre-existed in our mind has not been made for this very intuition which now supervenes, it is only adapted to it more or less imperfectly. Perception results from an adjustment of intuition to concept, and of concept to intuition. And this adjustment calls for sagacity, acuteness, assurance, calculation, ingenuity, and sense of proportion. It does not develop automatically. It implies a veritable creation. This work of accommodation constitutes the third stage of perception, it cannot be referred to the preceding stages. Moreover, it is effected quite

uniformly. It transforms, renders flexible, diversifies, multiplies concepts, and, in that very way, makes the subject capable of experiencing sundry intuitions in an increasing number of circumstances. From this it can be seen that the intellect, also, aims at the Beyond. An intelligent man is the man for whom any newly-communicated idea engenders other ideas; the man who, as we say, not merely sees and hears, but thinks.

Thus man is indeed, as Pascal would have us realise, a being who transcends both things and himself.

Still, what are we to gather from this? How can all these original reactions of the subject, these deformations of the given object, these creations, be anything else than phenomena of the subject himself? Do they represent objective value? Do they attest the actual existence, or simply the idea, the feeling, the illusion of an Inner Beyond?

To examine these questions without prejudging the reply and without shutting ourselves within a vicious circle, we ought to make a distinction that is frequently omitted: we must separate two meanings of the word "objective."

There is, firstly, the dualistic meaning, which is that of ordinary usage. From this standpoint, an object is *there*, in the sense that it is self-existent, has such and such properties, and passes through such and such states. Our ideas, which exist outside that object, *i.e.* which are radically distinct from it, have an objective value if they are in conformity with that same object. Two irreducible things, A and B, are here in presence of one another : objectivity is the fact of the second giving a faithful interpretation of the first.

A clear conception, because it is materialistic. We picture to ourselves a mirror set before an object, and giving a faithful image of that object.

But this objectivity is not primary, it is derivative. It has no meaning unless there exists an altogether different objectivity, a non-dualistic objectivity.

The object which is there, with a nature that is peculiar and independent of the activity of the subject, is, after all, a fiction. This so-called thing is constantly corrected, modified, remoulded, and recreated by the mind itself. The dualism that such an ob-

22 THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

jectivity takes for granted is a mental operation. We see therein the mind organising one part of its representations—that which appears to admit of order and of systematisation—so as to bring the other part into harmony with it. And this organisation is always in the state of becoming, always modifiable and perfective, never completed. In the light of this, let us once more look at the object presupposed by the dualistic theory of objectivity. It is not self-sufficient; it is really in need of having an objective value conferred upon it; it implies a principle of objectivity which is more profound—one in which subject and object are no longer distinct entities.

If dualistic and scientific objectivity is only derivative, where can fundamental objectivity reside?

Aristotle said, speaking of truth, of objectivity in the mental sphere, that the ultimate standard is not to be found in a thing that is given and observable from without, but in activity itself—in the living reason of man as properly constituted: *ἔοικε γὰρ . . . μέτρον ἑκάστω ἥ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι*. It is an analogous standpoint that

we reach when we come to deal with the principle of objectivity in general. This principle can only be discovered in reason herself, in so far as she is, essentially, in communion with being. It is just because of its construction under the guidance of reason, that the object with which reflective and scientific thought confronts its concepts possesses an objective value. We are bound to attribute superior value or objectivity to the original working of the mind, ere we are justified in attributing like value to the objects of its own construction.

Now, the mind is grounded on the ability and on the will to create harmoniously. It takes upon itself the task of expanding in every possible way, and of realising itself in forms of existence that are mutually attracted, that are concordant, that produce beautiful and well-ordered worlds.

Even the given world—what we call reality—is the fruit of the Inner Beyond which tends to realise itself, but this very realisation sets forth the superiority of the invisible harmony over that which is visible: *ἀρμονίῃ ἀφανὲς φανερῆς κρείττων* (the invisible harmony surpasses the visible), said Heraclitus.

24 THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN

That is why the mind seeks to realise the surplus which is within it, by ways other than those of objective experience and of positive science : by metaphysics, by art, by religion.

In metaphysics we have to do with knowledge : we are led to consider living beings, not only from the standpoint of their nature and of their actual relations, but from the standpoint of their creation and of their *raison d'être*.

Art represents the struggle towards the Beyond in the sphere of production. It consists in the attempt to create—with materials borrowed from our world, from that material world wherein our being loses itself—another world wherein we may find ourselves at home, a human world.

Finally, religion constitutes the endeavour to amplify, to enlarge, to transfigure the very foundations of our being, through that power which enables us to participate in an existence other than our own, and which strives to embrace even the infinite, viz., love. The principle of religion is what has been called the ontological argument : let the kingdom of God come—let the perfect be realised !

While nature says : *nemo ultra posse tenetur* (power is the measure of obligation), the maxim of religion is : you ought, therefore you can. And religion does really confer on nature the power of realising what, from the naturalistic standpoint, was unrealisable. Religion pledges, in the innermost depths of the soul, the fundamental unity of the Given and of the Beyond, and she promises the gathering inflow of the latter into the former.

III

To sum up, the Inner Beyond of which we are conscious proves its reality by appearing, in the light of philosophic reflection, as the condition of the essential elements of human life, viz., action, volition, and perception as therein revealed to us. If this Beyond is real, the forms of life which more particularly express it are legitimate and worthy of development. We would indicate, along with positive science, such forms as metaphysics, art, and religion.

And it is fitting to remark that the Inner Beyond—whose reality we have tried to establish, in the most direct way possible,

by fusing, as it were, intuition and deduction—bestows, once its existence is admitted, a real value upon those methods of inward and even outward observation which at an earlier stage we felt bound to reject as insufficient. They do not suffice; but, sustained by a true appreciation of what lies at the bottom of reason itself, they become instructive.

The subliminal self may put us in communication, not only with beings that are like or inferior to ourselves, but with superior existences, if the possibility of such existences is once established.

The special concepts implied in what is called religious experience, and without which this experience would not differ from ordinary experience or from similar pathological experience, are no longer simple imaginations or traditions, if their content is justified by analysis of the very conditions of human life and reason.

In conclusion, there is not even a naïve belief in an Outer Beyond, which does not acquire some legitimacy and some value, if the outer world is nothing else than the effect and the symbol of that spiritual infinity which is peculiar to the Inner Beyond. The

words of St Paul find here their application :
ὅς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκὶ, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι
(He that was manifested according to the
flesh has been justified according to the
spirit).

II

MORALITY AND RELIGION ¹

AMONG the general ideas, more or less clearly noticeable, which at the present moment determine opinion, and which incite men to sharp controversies, there are few so important as those which concern the relationship between morality and religion. What are we to infer from the numerous disputes over freedom, social life, family life, education, law, rational existence, save that some find in nature and in human reason alone, all the necessary and sufficient conditions of thought and of action, while others adhere to the

¹ This address, delivered (spring of 1910) in the *Foi et Vie* Lecture Hall, appeared as an article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1st September 1910. Its "essential value," both as an epitome of Prof. Boutroux's thought, and as a literary achievement, has been indicated by Monsieur Paul Sabatier (*vide* the very interesting chapter upon the "philosophico-religious views of J. M. Guyau and of Émile Boutroux," in the volume, "L'Orientation Religieuse de la France Actuelle," published by Armand Colin, Paris, 1911).—
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

belief that man is not self-sufficing, but must, in order to fulfil his destiny, rely on some principle that transcends him? And, assuredly, this contest has been waged from the earliest times. "What avails Jupiter," said Chrysippus the Stoic, "if Dion can, of himself, attain his ends!" But perhaps the two conflicting principles have never appeared so irreconcilable as they do nowadays.

This question would appear to have developed during the last few centuries. In the time of Descartes and of Leibnitz, morality and religion harmonised naturally, as two emanations proceeding from a common source. It came within the divine purpose that man should play his part as a rational being, even while he was tending, under supernatural guidance, towards a higher perfection. But in the Romantic period—when men ran into extremes, favouring contrasts and antinomies—the bond that united reason and faith, temporal life and spiritual life, seemed to be broken. Reason, it was maintained, being fundamentally pantheistic or even naturalistic, could not attempt to explain spiritual things without distorting them through the medium of its own peculiar interpretations. Religion,

on the other hand, being intended to satisfy the transcendent needs of the conscience, of the emotions and of the imagination, appeared burdensome whenever she intervened in the political life of communities. How, if this was the case, could the idea of moral order and of social preservation, then prevalent, be realised? The way of overcoming this difficulty was found in what may be called the bulkhead or separate compartment plan. "Render to Cæsar that which is Cæsar's, and to God that which is God's": this was the maxim of the time. Justice and charity, the State and the community, public life and private life, the real and the ideal, reason and faith, morality and religion were respectively separated from one another by insurmountable barriers. The human soul itself, compounded—as was then believed—of radically distinct faculties, found no difficulty in living, after a fashion, simultaneously, several lives with no connecting link between them.

And yet, see how completely these barriers, erected by an ingenious conservatism, have been shattered. Justice and charity are combined; the State intervenes in the economic, social and moral life of individuals; science

invades the sanctuaries which were denied her, and claims that all things, without exception, are subject to her control; and the human mind sees its various faculties merged in a life fundamentally one, whose special characteristic is just the power of co-ordination, of synthesis, of unification.

Between morality and religion, the frontiers are obliterated in like manner. And the consequences of this change are peculiarly grave. On all sides we encounter thought-systems which tend to demonstrate that morality suffices alike in itself and in its meaning for us; that it possesses its own principles which are altogether rational and analogous to those of the positive sciences; that it gives satisfaction to all the real needs of the conscience, even to the most exalted; that its sway covers the entire field of individual and of social life; and that outside its laws there can only be fanaticism, routine, or idle sentimentality. Sometimes, when appeal is made to the conscience, or to the reason, or to what may be termed the moral sense, it is affirmed that each man bears within him, in his very nature, all those principles which are requisite for the guidance of

human life ; sometimes, we are referred to such methods of observation and of induction as are practised in the experimental sciences, in order to establish a fixed code of positive laws called moral laws ; sometimes, morality appears as a practical art, which, like industry in general, does not possess any peculiar principle, and which is nothing else than the methodical application of theoretical principles furnished by a particular branch of science, viz., that relating to human manners or to the conditions of social life. Contrariwise, religion to-day does not acknowledge that she is limited to the sphere of purely spiritual matters. How, otherwise, could she be on her guard against the progress of a lay mind which is specially bent on destroying her ? She also has learnt to realise the genuine oneness, the indisputable solidarity of the temporal and the spiritual ; moreover, she deems it unworthy of her to purchase freedom in the other world at the price of present servitude. If mind exists, and if it is supreme, everything must bow to it. Is not the prayer of the Christian : Let the divine will be accomplished on earth, even as it is realised in heaven !

It would seem, then, that morality and religion are at present engaged in setting forth their respective claims to dominion. And, apparently, the only possible issue of the conflict resulting from these pretensions is that expressed in the well-worn phrase: the one will kill the other!

This view of the case, moreover, is very widespread at the present day, and, on that very account, already calculated to precipitate the event. Still, are we bound to abide by it, under pretext of belonging to our own time and of participating in its prejudices? What, then, is philosophy, unless it be an examination, at once calm and exempt from question-begging, of even the most accredited opinions? It is amazing how frequently a doctrine which, at one particular time, is accepted as actual proof, may be regarded, at a later period, as a mere historical curiosity. The fact is that our ideas reflect, to a greater extent than we realise, our acts, our passions, our casual and transitory habits. And, even when we try to reason, are we not often deceived by that time-honoured fallacy of an alternative, which, pre-disposing us to

regard as contradictory things that are only different, brutally forces us to declare for one or other of them ? .

I

If we would extend our appeal beyond the circle of those who already share our opinions, we must question ourselves as to the method that will best suit our purpose. Men who find themselves in opposite camps, have, as a rule, but little understanding of one another, because they are influenced by different mental habits, by different tests, by different notions, ere deciding how to conduct an inquiry.

As regards the problem of the relations between morality and religion, the method most commonly adopted is what may be called the conceptual method. We start from certain definitions, and setting them opposite one another, we infer, by way of syllogistic reasoning, the desired solution.

This method has several advantages. It gives the mind a feeling of clearness ; and, we know that, in France at any rate, clearness is readily acknowledged to be synonymous

with truth. Did not Descartes make evidence the test of certainty? We have, indeed, to remember that he gave to the words "evidence" and "certainty" an extremely subtle meaning which it would be difficult to convey, in any clear manner, to the reader uninitiated in metaphysical inquiry.

The conceptual method impresses the mind by its logical force. When an argument is well developed, we are fascinated; and we easily frame our judgment upon insufficient premises. In some indescribable way we find ourselves impelled to judge the essence of a thing by its external form, and to believe that what follows from this must be true. How rarely do we employ our reasoning faculty! Usually speaking, we are content to state an opinion, and, by way of demonstration, to affirm it dogmatically, or to develop it with words, with comparisons, with examples, with images. Any speech in which, through an elegant diction, we can discern principles, a reasoning process, and a conclusion according to rule, has gained a great deal of support in advance. Pedantry is in no danger of going out of fashion.

The conceptual method is capable of being put to considerable use.

For instance, let us, first of all, define morality as the adaptation of a man's inward dispositions to the circumstances of his life; and, then, let us define religion as contempt for actual existence, and pursuit of so-called supernatural ends, contrary to the ends that nature offers. Once allow such definitions as these, it becomes immediately clear that morality and religion are incompatible, and that we are compelled to choose between them.

Now, let us define morality as the sum of rational rules affecting human conduct; and religion as the subjective representation of those rules as divine commands; it will inevitably follow that religion is merely a buttress, so to speak, of morality, and is subordinate to it.

To make matters even, we may still further define religion as a totality of obligatory beliefs, involving definite practices which are connected with the objects given in such beliefs; and morality as a logical system of abstract formulæ, an intellectual transposition of religious beliefs. Thereafter it can

easily be shown that morality is only an offshoot, *i.e.* a dependency of religion.

Each of these theories is plausible enough in a way, and, having regard to the special type of audience, may prove easily victorious in professorial teaching or in discussion. The customary method of instruction, of lecture and of dialectical tourney, serves greatly to commend that reduction of things to concepts, which gives the spoken word so much clearness and weight, and which yields to the hearers such an excellent chance of committing, either to paper or to memory, the salient points and the logical coherence of an address.

But the success of a method in the field of dialectical competition is not sufficient to guarantee its value. The conceptual method has the inconvenience of lending itself equally to demonstration of the most contrary theses. This result is attained through a radical insufficiency.

However well a definition may be drawn up, it is a closed system of concepts, which the mind substitutes for reality. Now, how can we be sure that reality is truly maintained in our formal statements? As a matter of fact, we know quite well that our concept can

never altogether comprise the real; that the latter is not to be confused with the extract of it that we get in a receiver prepared beforehand. We set our minds at rest, it is true, by assuming that what lies without, cannot fail to resemble that which we have apprehended after serious investigation. But, in pursuing this course, we do nothing more than take for granted the very point which is in question. Let us suppose that the faculty of producing something new, to which we give the name life, and which we find in nature, is—especially in the mental sphere—not simply an appearance, but a reality; and we at once deem it contradictory and impossible that our concepts, unalterably closed and fixed, should ever quite fully express reality. Incapable of ever being exact, they have to be compared with the real, and remodelled in such a way as to make them imitate, in the fullest measure attainable, the essential potency of evolution. Yet again: this residuum, to which our mental concepts cannot be assimilated, if it is nothing else than the life inherent in our nature as men, must possess a capacity which seems to be characteristic of life in general,

viz., that of rejoicing in numerous incompatibilities which it suits our logic to enforce. To live and to die, to remain oneself and to change, to be moved from without and to be capable of self-motion : these things, according to our concepts, are irreconcilable ; for a living person, they are all one. At what value, henceforward, shall we rate that triumphant scholarly achievement which consists in setting up, first of all, such or such a definition of morality and of religion, and in deducing, afterwards, from these definitions, the logical identity or incompatibility of the two activities indicated ? While the logician emphatically declares their separation, nothing, in the world of reality, hinders their union and co-operation. Is not what we designate in ordinary life by the word “superiority” just the power of harmonising and uniting qualities which, in the usual course of things, appear incompatible ? When we desire to distinguish man’s excellence, in comparison with other beings, do we not say that he is a microcosm ?

However apparent may be the defects of the conceptual method, however common-

place may be the condemnation of abstract logic, it is, actually, that method which, in current discussions, is the most employed. Our understanding has a bent for the pleasing doctrine called Ontology, which, from the clearness of ideas, infers their truth. The instinct for reality, nevertheless, affects an ever-increasing number of thinking men at the present time, and makes them prepare for a serious effort to place fact above concept, and to apprehend life directly, in its real and peculiar development. Such men substitute the historical method for the conceptual method. Going back, as far as possible, to the sources of civilisation, and comparing the respective progressions of the different peoples, they strive to unravel the universal and fundamental tendencies of human genius ; and, entrenching themselves behind minute observations conducted on such a vast scale, they imagine that they can arrive at the exact distinction between those elements of human life which are appointed to subsist and to develop, and those which are doomed to disappear !

This method is frequently adopted in studying the relations of religion and morality.

In this way, for instance, we are shown that morality is rooted historically in antagonism to religion; that it sprang from man's protest against the despotism and the injustice of his gods; that, if occasionally it has seemed to harmonise with religion, this is because the latter, constrained by the popular conscience to make peace with her rival, has allowed herself to be modified accordingly; that morality has, more and more, tended to develop, throughout the ages, in an independent fashion; and that, consequently, it is destined to become self-sufficing and to drive out entirely the various forms of religion.

Our attention is specially drawn to the ancient Greek philosopher, Xenophanes, one of the first to set forth the teachings of morality in contrast with those of religion. "It is not," said he, "the gods who have created men, it is men who have created the gods; for consider if these latter are not greatly inferior to men! Homer and Hesiod depict the gods as exulting in everything which, with us men, is deemed shameful and criminal." Socrates, the founder of morality as an ethical system, makes it depend solely

upon self-knowledge. "As to knowing if what has been related about the gods is true, I have not time," he protested, "to probe such difficult problems ; I have quite enough to do in trying to understand what I am." And, turning to a recent vigorous work by Mr Gustave Spiller on the independence of morality, we find it entitled : "Faith in Man," or—to be more exact—*Faith in Man, the Religion of the Twentieth Century* (Swan Sonnenschein, 1908). Moreover, the adherents of religion itself have never ceased to condemn this demand on man's part for autonomy. And it is precisely through shaking off the yoke of religious authority that morality has attained the remarkable degree of progress which is so evident to-day.

This, we are assured, is the teaching of history. To pretend that we can hold the balance between morality and religion is to ignore the secular gains of humanity ; it is to set the sentimental repugnance resulting from a backward state of mind in opposition to the trend of universal thought.

Still, it is well to ask, is the historical evolution here invoked, beyond all question ? If facts of a particular kind, conveniently

selected and interpreted, present such an evolution, can we not distinguish others, no less real, which seem to manifest a different evolution? We have been told that Socrates based morality on the observation of human life. The statement is true; but Socrates was a profoundly religious person: he believed that man was in direct communion with the divine. He believed in divine laws as furnishing the pattern for human laws. Did the fact of his carefully examining human nature rather than the legends drawn from the poets mean, for him, alienation from the gods? On the contrary it meant closer access to them. Morality as a science was implicitly made, by its founder, subordinate to the invocation of divine Providence. And a similar remark holds good as regards Kant, the organiser of ethical science in modern times. He also is, to the very marrow, imbued with the religious spirit. It has even been possible to assert that his Categorical Imperative is nothing else than the abstract and general form of the Ten Commandments.

The fact that sometimes the foster-child strikes his nurse, does not abolish his indebtedness to her for the strength that he employs

so adversely. It is by no means absurd to see, in our ideas of justice, of duty, of worth, of integrity, of altruism, of brotherhood, of humanity, of submission to the laws of the universe, a simple transposition of those religious rules which have to do with obedience to God, with protection of the weak, with alleviation of misery, with benevolence, with salvation, with those super-individuals who are destined to illumine the realm of human personality. Most assuredly, Moses, Buddha, Jesus, St Paul, Mahomet, Luther do not teach abstract dogmas. Their efforts are directed towards transforming man's outer and inner life, towards rendering it stronger, deeper, purer, nobler. But let these concrete creations be submitted to philosophic reflection, or even simply to that natural force of habit, which gradually separates deeds from their principle, and effects from their cause: and religion, in its various forms, will give birth to just such ethical codes as those which are in full operation among us.

Our very systems of so-called independent morality can scarcely be said to retain nothing specifically religious. There is religion *and*

religion. Reverence, assurance without experimental proof, inner life, the search—beyond our egotistic and satisfied self—for a better self, capable of entering into other people's sufferings and of being devoted to some ideal end, can have but little or nothing in common with what is external in actual religions ; yet, does it follow that such dispositions are exclusively moral ? Are they not rather the expressions—intellectualised, but very recognisable—of religious feeling ? Certain existing associations aim expressly at cultivating morality in itself, freed from all dependence upon religious dogmas or metaphysical speculations. If you attend the gatherings of these societies without apprehending the language which is spoken, you will imagine yourself witnessing a religious service ; and if, at such gatherings, you are able to understand the hymns that are sung and the addresses that are given, you will find that what distinguishes them from ordinary religious utterances is mainly that God is replaced by the Ideal, or by Mind, or by Truth, Beauty and Goodness.

The historical relation between morality and religion is obscure. Besides, it is possible

to call in question the decisive significance that is attributed to it. Do we allow that morality is indeed, as many declare, based upon antagonism to religion? Must we infer that there can never be reconciliation between them? Men deceive themselves as to the extent of their disagreements. Was Aristotle actually such a radical opponent of Platonism as he was believed to be? May not the works of Victor Hugo be conceded an enduring place in literature without consigning those of Racine to oblivion? Are nations, individuals, or ideas condemned to internecine warfare, because, in order to exist and to grow, they began by opposing one another? This is the rule: youths gain knowledge first of all through withstanding their fathers; and, afterwards, they carry on the parental work. The origin and history of morality do not reveal its genuine trend and ultimate meaning.

The prejudice which makes us read the future in the past, springs from the mind's effort to reduce movement to fixity, life to matter. Haunted by the fear that life brings into operation, upon this present world-stage, certain veritably new phenomena, the logical

understanding imagines that within the nature of living beings is included, as an unchangeable entity, the law of their entire development. Hence, it is sufficient, in analysing the initial direction of this progressive movement, and a suitable portion of its course, to determine the formal statement of this law in order to be in a position to predict, from beginning to end, the entire career of a given being.

But, understood literally, this doctrine can only mean that life does not exist. According to the special rule in Mechanics, one may describe *a priori* the trajectory of a point whose conditions of movement are determined. If life exists, it is not merely development, it is evolution; and this latter—when we look more closely into it—is quite another thing. Development, strictly so-called, only brings to light what was prefigured in germ: evolution gives rise to features that nothing, perhaps, foreshadowed. Certainly in history many folk think that they can discover real developments, thoroughly logical and uniform: as a matter of fact, such “developments” are due to subsequent reflection. Our thought runs backward like a fissure.

Starting from a being that is now before us, we discern amongst the forms which it assumed at an earlier stage, those which led up to the present form, and we ignore or set aside the rest: consequently, the germ, as we have ideally composed it, contains potentially the whole future history of the being in question. But reality is different. A living person is a being who seeks, makes an effort, gropes about, runs a risk; guiding himself in accordance with his experience, cultivating his powers and remoulding himself, in order to succeed in the tasks that he has chosen. Not that he creates, unconditionally, *ex nihilo*, the forms which he acquires; but what pre-exists in him is no finished and stationary nature such as we see in a geometrician's equation—it is a totality of living and supple faculties, of genuine capabilities for contingent and unforeseeable action.

History, indeed, helps us to understand the nature of living beings through showing us what properties they have unfolded, and in what manner. But, if she is thus instructive and quite irreplaceable, that is because the destiny of living beings is not pre-shaped in their nature. If this were so, a day would

come sooner or later, when, this nature having been exactly determined, no purpose would be served by continuing to note its manifestations. History, in that case, satisfied with gleaning anecdotes—after journalistic fashion—around important events, would have nothing serious to teach us. In short, her records would be altogether framed in advance, engraved from all eternity in the very substance of things ; and she would lose all that, for us, constitutes her reality and her interest.

We could not, then, in order to assign the connection between morality and religion, satisfy ourselves with considering and with interpreting the history of their relations. If it is true that what has been, is ever but an inadequate measure of what may or ought to be, we are compelled to have recourse to a deeper and more philosophical method.

But from the first, is it not an illusion to believe that in such a matter we can begin by fixing, once for all, the method which it is most convenient to follow ? This way of proceeding is very efficacious in teaching, to which it imparts great clearness ; and it is,

as a rule, only replaced in appearance by a feigned method of research and of induction. But it is one thing, as Descartes most clearly realised, to exhibit science as made or as assumed to be so, and another thing to construct it in very truth. Nowhere, not even in the mathematical sciences, can the method really be detached from the object. Far from preceding research, it is an integral part thereof; and it is determined in proportion to the progress of discovery. Moreover, it is never definitely suppressed, because the principles of things are not the most obvious element in it, but the most hidden and the least accessible. For a long time we regarded Mathematics as entirely deductive and abstract: to-day we find ourselves admitting that this particular science is inductive and generalisable, as well as the other sciences; and the workers in this sphere of research no longer expect that they can ever dispense with intuition. The mode of observation, of induction, of systematisation varies with the objects; and here we recall the special merit of Auguste Comte, who fully recognised that, if the general idea of science is one, there must be as many

different scientific methods as there are orders of existence irreducible for us.

That which is true in the material sphere holds good, to an even greater extent, in the mental region ; and we run the risk of overlooking the essential characteristics of what is real in this region, when, under pretext of scientific knowledge, we treat them after methods suited to other objects. Doubtless, to know is to grasp, to comprehend according to a permanently classic metaphor. And to comprehend, to embrace is to enclose, by means of prehensory instruments at our disposal. We can only perceive through concepts. But, if knowledge is to be something else than a mere game, in which the mind only looks to realities for an opportunity of diverting itself, the intellect must constantly strive to render its concepts flexible, in adapting them to the data of an intuition that is ceaselessly renewed. Mental things are so shifting, loose, complex, profound and baffling, that with respect to them especially we have to avoid a disposition for fixed and immovable thought-moulds, when we declare our disregard for that which may be conformable to them.

Indeed, the method which we apply in the positive sciences is far from possessing the homogeneity and absolute precision that we are inclined to attribute to it. It brings into play two essential processes : hypothesis and observation. We must, first of all, start from a question, *i.e.* from a hypothesis ; for every question involves at least a conditional affirmation. To see for the sake of seeing is tantamount to not seeing. The astronomer, who knows what he ought to see, sees it—sometimes even when there is no object actually presented. But an ignorant person who expects from the object quite alone the sensation that he is bound to experience, sees only confused forms, or even sees nothing at all. In speaking of a scientific observation we mean the comparing of a pre-existent idea with experience. The concept, moreover, is but the first element of the method ; while the intuition—as impartial as possible—of the given reality constitutes the second element. Insufficient in itself alone, intuition is indispensable, since without it the hypothesis, lacking restraint, easily sets up a dogmatic claim to be the truth.

Now, what we ought specially to note is

that these two moments—conception of a hypothesis and verification of that hypothesis by intuition—do not suffice to obtain the looked-for knowledge. In fact, between concept and intuition there is an irreducible heterogeneity. By our “concepts” we imply, with the assistance of our memory and of our imagination, our recognised means of simplification, our wish to see things fixed, distinct, arranged according to relations of identity and of contradiction, in such a way as to become our own, and to be transmuted into objects proportioned to our intelligence. By “intuition” we imply the renunciation of every preconceived idea and of all pretence to comprehend nature—the absolute abandonment of the mind to the control, to the influence, to the revelations that nature furnishes. And, as the Abbé Cotin aptly remarked, “nature has more ways of making things than we have of knowing them.” There is always a disproportion between the infinitude, the novelty, the fluidity, the divisibility, the life, which characterises her productions, and the finitude, the homogeneity, the explicitness, the endless instability, that our concepts postulate. For all that, know-

ledge is the fusion of a concept with an intuition. And the manner in which this fusion is effected, decides its value. We are disposed to combine automatically the concepts and the intuitions which appear together in our consciousness. But these accidental associations are without scientific import. The only combinations of concepts and intuitions which have any chance of being approved by the generality of intelligent people, are those effected under the control of a mental faculty which dominates both intuitions and concepts, and which is nothing else than right perception or reason. Science, which tends to mechanise things, cannot, itself, be constructed after a mechanical fashion. Even as Descartes teaches, the first principle of science is to be found in that frank exercise of reason, *bona mens*, through which we realise the mutual adaptation of concepts to intuitions and of intuitions to concepts, of man to things and of things to man.

If it is true that reason has a part to play even in the physical sciences, should she not, *a fortiori*, intervene in the mental sphere. In order to appreciate exactly the rôle that she claims therein, we must render a precise

account of what she is. Human reason is not that abstract system of categories which philosophers have sometimes imagined. Descartes adopted as his special task the cultivation of his reason, meaning thereby that reason is no entirely ready-made affair, fashioned in a man beforehand; that he, on his part, has to develop it, to create it within him by toil, by effort, by a genuinely intelligent will. In order to exist and to flourish, reason must be supplied with two kinds of nourishment: the sciences and experience of life. Reason is not theoretical in part, and practical in part. Kant has clearly seen that she is both the one and the other. But the Greeks were not deceived when they believed that in her these two qualities are inseparable. Reason is the unity of thought and action. It is this meaning that even now still attaches to the word in common parlance.

Applied to the positive sciences, reason is that right perception which, through the blending of intuitions and concepts, constitutes what is called objectivity. In the mental region she does more. Notice how, as Aristotle used to say, she determines in

that region not only what is possible, but what is convenient, τὸ δυνατόν καὶ τὸ πρέπον. She extends the notion of objectivity from the real to the ideal. She sets up or distinguishes ideas which, though they cannot be applied to objects of sense-perception, are none the less worthy and susceptible of being held as true by thinking men everywhere—that which specially implies objectivity.

The question of knowing what method we ought to adopt in treating the problem of the relations between religion and morality must, it would seem, be solved in the following manner. It is, indeed, necessary to collect the fullest possible information, to be in possession of the most subtle concepts devised by theologians, moralists and philosophers, as well as of that mass of facts which historians have accumulated. But neither concepts nor facts suffice: facts and concepts cannot, alone, be adjusted so as to produce true notions. The faculty which, through the proper blending of intuitions and concepts, can fashion harmonious and enduring creations, is reason—that effectual union of method and knowledge, of thought and action.

If we study the relations existing between religion and morality from the strictly rational standpoint, *i.e.* in a manner that is living and practical, and not merely speculative or empirical, we shall do our best to consider morality and religion, less under the given form that they assume here or there, than under the ideal form which presides over their evolution and progress. And perhaps these same two active principles which, so long as they cling to the pursuit of subordinate issues, withstand one another, will appear convergent if we consider them as they move on toward higher ends.

Nor is that all. Science strictly so-called does not imagine, between concepts, any connections other than synthetic or analytic relations. The two contrasted terms which figure in the enunciation of a physical law are bound together synthetically. The reduction of particular laws to general laws is effected through assimilation, analytically. But reason approves and determines, besides these two types of relation (the one empirical, the other logical), relations of fitness or of harmony, which participate, at one and the same time, in the characteristics of both

types, but which, by the intimate fusion of these apparently irreducible characteristics, constitute an original creation. It is upon the more or less conscious conviction of such relational possibilities that our very life as men rests. We endeavour to create rational solidarities, closer and deeper than the conjunctions given in experience, more adapted to the individual and to the contingent than those based on pure logic. It is precisely relations of this kind that, since the days of a Plato or of an Aristotle, metaphysicians have striven to define. Reason, the object and the instrument of their investigation, is the faculty which, above physical and logical relations, sets relations of concrete intelligibility — interconnecting no longer facts or concepts, but living beings.

In the name of reason, then, we may try to discover, between morality and religion, not only an empirical relation of co-existence or of separation, or yet again a logical relation of identity or of contradiction, but a metaphysical relation of solidarity and of free agreement, persisting throughout the differences which distinguish them. Life is not the abolition of diversity, it is the organisa-

tion of differences with a view to common action. The power of reason is gauged by the multiplicity and by the variety of those positive and fitly enduring elements which she knows how to blend in a rich and living union.

The question of the relations between morality and religion can be treated from several standpoints. But perhaps we men of to-day are mainly concerned in knowing whether morality can and ought to be regarded as wholly independent of religion, and as adequate, in itself, to guide human life. We will confine ourselves to seeking for some degree of light upon this important point. And, maybe, we shall have a chance of success if we look carefully into the conditions: firstly, of the purpose; secondly, of the efficacy; thirdly, of the progress, attaching to ethical rule.

II

We have to acknowledge that it is indeed quite possible to determine moral regulations without enunciating any metaphysical or re-

ligious principle. To be explicit, we can advance in morals, just as we can advance in the positive sciences through merely observing and collecting facts, and through classifying them in accordance with their resemblances and with their differences. We should thus be able, starting from multiplicity and diversity, to attain unity, to unfold the principles suitable for systematising phenomena, and to establish Ethics as a science analogous to Physics or to Chemistry. And, to all appearance, such a result would really coincide with what is ordinarily meant by Ethics or Morality. Taken in itself, morality is nothing else than the aggregate of rules, consciously expressed or not, which control the laws and customs of a given community, the judgments formed by individuals on others and on themselves, as well as the search after well-being in outward action and in conscious intent.

But, although actually possible, is the determination of moral principles, apart from every metaphysical or religious assumption, equally possible and legitimate in the truest sense? What, exactly, is that observation and that induction by means of which we

express and systematise ordinary moral notions ?

In the positive sciences we scarcely put such questions as these, except from a purely technical standpoint : we aim at discovering the practical conditions of a research that shall be as minute and exact as possible, at making a rigorous induction proportioned to the data of experience. Still, in these same sciences, there are, really—for the man who looks deeply into their existential conditions—certain postulates of a metaphysical character, the adoption or rejection of which cannot be regarded with indifference. But there is general agreement on the subject of these postulates ; they may be described in brief as amounting to the admission that all the phenomena of nature are subject to what are called natural laws. That is why, in study of a strictly scientific character, we do not feel ourselves bound to find out their meaning. Morality is not, in this respect, to be classed with the physical sciences.

It would seem necessary to make a distinction between principle and foundation. Principle, properly so-called, is the general

and abstract proposition whence we are able to infer syllogistically the multiplicity of particular propositions which experience supplies. By foundation is implied that concrete reality which brings phenomena into existence. Now, the positive sciences appear to have decided, from their special standpoint, the question of foundation in such a manner as to rid themselves of it in practice : their postulates have become, in a way, forms of thought, organised habits. Can something like this be said when we come to deal with the science of ethics ?

Observation and induction were recommended by Socrates as yielding the right method in the moral sphere. And to many people it seems that Socrates thereby established morality as an independent science. But careful reflection will show that Socratic observation was the natural outcome of certain beliefs which, from the first, determined its object and meaning. Socrates, taking human opinion as his starting-point, endeavours—in harmony with that assumption—to define piety, justice, virtue, well-being, wisdom, freedom. Clearly, he admits that these things exist, and that their exist-

ence is legitimate and desirable. He rightly wishes to know what ought to be done in order to realise them according to their true essence. But these objects imply, of necessity, elements which cannot be likened to simple facts: such elements, for instance, as the value attributed to certain existential forms which are represented in ideas rather than manifested in reality; the task, devolving upon man, of working for the realisation of ideal ends; the possibility, granted him, of making his reason prevail over his instincts; and the co-operation of invisible forces towards crowning his efforts and towards ensuring the success of his labours. If Socratic observation helps us to know our duty, our dignity as men, our higher destinies, that is because it presupposes belief in those indemonstrable objects. To see is to interpret. The scientist finds laws in nature because in his own mind dwells the idea of the law to which he relates phenomena. And, similarly, because the Socratic moralist contemplates moral facts with a mind already imbued with belief in duty and in the ideal, he learns by observation that man has duties to perform and an ideal to seek.

That is Socratic observation, that is the question which it puts to nature. The reply to this question is dependent upon its terms. Shall we maintain that we are obliged, ere commencing observation, to discard every postulate, and simply to open our eyes so as to see things as they are in themselves? That is really impossible: to know means to know again, to recognise. If concept without intuition is void, intuition without concept is blind—to use the Kantian phrase.

But are we, then, to conclude that there is nothing to prevent our applying to the study of morals the same kind of observation which has proved successful in the sciences, and which is endowed with the privilege of furnishing results that are obligatory on all minds? This solution, certainly, is quite conceivable. But since, when all is said, we find merely what we seek, the man who, in order to consider moral things, allows no postulates other than those which help him to understand physical things, will not discover, in his study of the moral world, realities in the ethical sense, but phenomena analogous to those of weight and equilibrium. The postulates of actual science are: the

reducibility of every phenomenon to mechanical forces acting in accordance with immutable laws ; the impossibility, for a compound, of possessing properties that cannot be adequately explained, as a matter of course, in the elements and the conditions whence it proceeds ; in short, the mutual determination of facts without the intervention of any spontaneity, *i.e.* mechanical determinism. Let us consider the moral manifestations of human nature from this exact standpoint ; and we shall obtain a science of behaviour which will have nothing in common with what is called morality, since it will only be a declaration and a systematisation of given phenomena, while morality is properly a rule—the enunciation of a duty to be performed.

Thus the sufficiency of morality resembles the sufficiency of an individual who, shutting his eyes, finds in self entirely a world whose source escapes him. Within his present self, indeed, survives the trace of bygone aeons :

“ Myself with Yesterday’s Sev’n Thousand Years,”

as Fitzgerald’s Omar Khayyam puts it. Thanks to social life, the thoughts of countless

millions are stamped upon his consciousness. And of these thoughts he imagines himself to be the originator.

Turning now to our second point, as regards the efficiency of the moral law, we have equally to recognise that the conscious appeal to motive powers obtained elsewhere than in morality strictly so-called, is not practically indispensable.

How, in the first place, can we escape the mechanical force of example, especially the example which is presented by our fellows, by persons of our own age and of our own condition? Look at the method employed in educating children. Their parents, their schoolmasters, their spiritual instructors have, for training purposes, lavished upon them during long years unbounded zeal and affection: an hour's conversation with a playmate causes this ideal construction to collapse in magic fashion. Example, good or bad, set by those whom we take as our models, has a wonderfully constraining power over the will. This law of example is widely recognised among people of the Anglo-Saxon race, who place their children as boarders in this or that

school or college, less with a view to the education that they will receive, than with a view to the playmates that they are likely to meet in such an institution. The atmosphere that we breathe, the company that we keep, moulds our being in ways unknown to us. Life is adaptation.

It would be extravagant, moreover, to suppose that genuinely educative action must be ineffectual. Kant very wisely pointed out the singular force of the precept: "You ought!" Man rejoices at the fixity of purpose impressed upon his naturally irresolute will, and he is raised in his own estimation, when he surrenders himself to a rule which is equally imperative for all, which represents a higher order of things, depending on him for its fulfilment. A uniform, for the most part, evokes a feeling of pride, because it symbolises settled employment, a *raison d'être*, a duty.

After all, mere exhortations, arguments, or formal proofs cannot have any practical effect. Man likes to believe that he is guided by sound judgment: that, when he adopts some regulative maxim, it is because he has, through personal reflection, realised a true

legitimacy. Assuredly, our theories proceed largely from our practical activity, of which they are often only the after justification; but they overawe us in themselves by their seeming impersonality. We have more self-assurance when we regard ourselves as subject, not to an impulse, but to a reasoning process—sophistical though it be. Assassins are persuaded that they serve the ends of inherent justice.

Ethical teaching, then, admits of an educative value. Just as a germ, inoculated in an organism, modifies it. Are we sure, however, that the germ is in itself adequate to produce the effect, and that the soil whereon it falls is indifferent?

Socrates, when he began the task of regenerating his fellow-citizens by offering instruction in moral truths, accurately enunciated the postulate that such an undertaking implies. "Nobody," said he, "does wrong intentionally. The explanation of vice is to be found in ignorance: to know what is good is to desire it." Do these statements express facts of experience? No one would dare to maintain it. The man who withstands the evidence of moral truths is just as much in existence

as the man who conforms himself thereto. And Socrates had no misgivings on this point, seeing that he made self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια) the first condition of even ascertaining human welfare. Ultimately, the connection between the science of virtue and virtue itself, that Socrates discerned at the bottom of human nature, was linked, in his view, with the existence of divine Providence and of universal harmony.

This way of regarding the matter determines the condition and soil, as it were, whose action ought to be combined with that of moral instruction, in order that the latter may bear fruit. The Socratic formula expresses thus, not what is, but what is required if morality is to have any practical value. It shows how utterly impossible is the claim of morality to be self-sufficing.

The interval which, in this field of discussion, separates theory from practice has been so constantly and so forcibly specified that, even from the standpoint of naturalistic philosophy, serious efforts have been made to fill it up.

A doctrine conceived with this aim is that of the existence of a collective conscience,

including our individual conscience, and dominating it. Human well-being, in this doctrine, is simply the object toward which the said collective conscience tends. Necessarily merged in this Universal Existence, of which it forms a part, the conscience of the individual recognises, as underlying itself, that moral impulse, that constraining power, which it could never gain from an abstract formula, and which is indispensable to it for the attainment of the knowledge born of love and action.

It is difficult to see in this *deus ex machina* a solution which is clearly enjoined upon the reason. How can we assimilate the existence of a collective conscience to those properly called facts which are indeed objects of experience? Doubtless, consciences are not shut out from one another, as people were fond of declaring in the last century. They arrive at a mutual understanding in some degree, and vibrate in unison, after a fashion. They reveal a certain interaction. They resemble one another in some aspects, just as, in others, they appear to be contrary—which is really equivalent to their resembling one another yet again. Now, what is this

collective conscience, at once multiple and single, the sum of our consciences and binding upon them? Is it not a hypothesis, or rather a metaphor, imagined expressly with a view to declaring the mutual influence of consciences upon one another, and with a view to justifying belief in the reality of duty, as well as in the possibility of fulfilling it?

Besides, is it so clear, after all, that virtue consists in submission to the sway of collective opinion? And is it necessary to point out, once more, that the great innovators in the ideal and moral region have been persecuted by their contemporaries, and that, consequently, we are bound to infer their opposition to the conscience of their own special period? In reality the collective conscience of to-day is the legacy which, transmitted by certain individual consciences of past times, has become the foundation of the consciences now existing. And some such actual conscience, at present deemed heretical, is destined, perhaps, to take the place of the collective conscience opposed to it.

Can we, on the other hand, in nature herself, regarded as spiritual reality immanent in our conscience and as immediately perceptible in

our experience, properly seek for that divine element—at once powerful and active—with which, clearly, it is impossible to dispense if we would have man raised to moral life by means of the only efficient leverage at his disposal? It is fitting, in this connection, that we should appreciate the courageous attempt of Monsieur Devolvé,¹ the true intellectual heir of that great artist, Carrière. But shall we, in this way, ever arrive at a genuinely philosophical view? No one doubts that if, by anticipation, we put into nature just as much as may be requisite to make man capable of realising moral ends, the problem of moral efficacy can be solved without our being obliged to quit nature. But it is impossible to allow that nature herself is presented to us just as the enthusiastic artist or the religious moralist sees her. Nature pure and simple constitutes, for present-day philosophy, the collection of facts that are observable by our senses, and that determine one another in the manner conceived by science. Everything that oversteps the above-defined limit is perceived, not in nature, but

¹ “Rationalisme et Tradition,” by Jean Devolvé (Alcan, Paris, 1910).

in the traditional human conscience, and, from the latter, is transferred to nature as tending to ennoble and to transfigure her.

It is futile to make a show of grounding upon experience alone the Socratic postulate :
“ To know what is good is to do it.”

Thirdly and lastly, what are we to think about the conditions of progress as regards our conception of the moral ideal ? Is this progress possible through the sole working of those very forces, in accordance with which our given world is regulated, or does it invoke the action of an invisible motive-power inaccessible to our experimental knowledge ?

As a matter of fact progress in moral ideas can be achieved without men appearing to invoke principles other than those embodied in their experience.

For instance, one method of progress often employed is the search for symmetry, for correspondence, for what is called logical agreement between the various regulations at work in a community. That is why, as soon as certain rights are recognised as belonging to a group of individuals, we proceed, in

pursuance of moral advance, to extend those rights to other groups, similar to the first. We thus try to bring about the universal and total abolition of all that recalls the dependence of man with regard to man, or yet again the integral assimilation of woman to man, or the equality of condition prevailing between all the members of a community.

A second empirically given source of progress in moral ideas is the prestige and influence of superior men. By the sheer force of their intelligence, by their energy, by the captivating form in which they so skilfully clothe their conceptions, by the durability and the magnitude of their work, they compel men's attention, and establish everywhere impressions and reflections which preserve, confirm and develop the new views that they have brought forward.

Lastly, we may affirm that human life in its entirety is compounded of attempts, of trials, of experiments, which, in some kind of automatic way, distinguish and separate true, noble and fruitful ideas from those that are worthless and not fitted to endure. History is a dialectical process. She calls forth conceivable explanations, criticises these same

explanations, and retains those among them which withstand her objections.

And so, by numerous tracks, morality appears, in the communities of our own day, to progress at will.

Still, it must be asked, are we justified in comparing the achievement which this progress engenders, with the mechanical working of given forces? Is there not here something else than the automatic production of a more fixed state of equilibrium between pre-existing elements? Or do we see the uprising of genuine inventions, of fresh creations really fitted to increase the dignity, and to enrich the essential qualities of human nature?

It is clear that the idea of progress in a moral direction implies, not only a more or less new arrangement of pre-existing notions, but the conception of a higher ideal, as well as of means destined to secure the realisation of such an ideal. Now, this meaning of the word progress becomes quite delusive if man has at his disposal merely elements of action that are furnished him by given reality. Though he imagines that he is doing better, man only succeeds in doing something else. He improves upon his working in the moral

sphere just as he improves upon it in the sphere of material production. He increases, in a mathematical sense, his power and means of action, but he sets aside the problem of ends, which, nevertheless, constitutes the whole problem of morality.

In order to remove this deficiency without calling for the intervention of any apparently supernatural principle, the method generally adopted from earliest times has consisted in pointing to the sure progress of enlightenment, and to its influence on moral progress. This method has been, again and again, refuted, and—to take a notable instance—Rousseau controverted it with striking effect ; yet it is continually being urged, because it has the double advantage of eliminating mystery, and of vouching that moral progress will take its own course without needing to labour for its realisation, since such realisation is nothing else than a mechanical result of natural laws.

Still, however extraordinary may be the progress of the sciences, it is not clear how they can ever, of themselves, engender the progress of moral ideas. Are the physical sciences here in question ? More unmistak-

ably to-day than ever, these sciences only direct us to what is—not to what ought to be; they consider facts and their interconnections, not ideal perfection and its union with reality. Maybe, what are called the moral sciences are in view? These sciences have a hybrid character: they are only constituted sciences through being artificially reduced to concepts and inserted *a priori* in our experience of elements which, in themselves, are irreducible to concept and to experience: viz., principles peculiar to morality—ideas of duty, of well-being, of conscience, of freedom.

Science, as such, remains powerless to guarantee the progress of legislation and life in the moral sense. Notwithstanding all the enthusiasm of our generation for science, this impotency is now more or less generally recognised; and we find scientists themselves, whenever they reflect on such matters, seeking, in a region outside knowledge pure and simple, for the foundations of moral progress.

What instruction fails to provide is to be discovered, many think, as the outcome of the natural law of adaptation, in so far as that law is necessarily applicable to the relations

existing between the individual and the community of which he forms a part. Is there not, say pleaders of this kind, in such an adaptation—which life itself imposes and realises increasingly every day—a principle of progress, corresponding, in the fullest manner, to the exigencies of conscience and of reason?

Certainly, moral progress is an adaptation, but it is not adaptation to a given thing, although that thing be society, *i.e.* the community. Humanity, in her search after moral progress, desires to be shaped in conformity with something that is superior to herself. If morality enjoins the adaptation of the individual to society, that is because society is regarded as of more value than any individual. It is not society, it is perfection, which is taken as model. Society is for its members a moral end, because it admits of a perfection exceeding that of which its individual members are capable. It is, then, to ideal society much more than to actual society that the conscience of the individual feels the obligation to adapt itself.

And even this ideal society is not the limit of moral aim. Man's ambition, in this sphere

of existence, stops short at nothing less than the bestowal upon his actions, upon his feelings, upon his thoughts, of an absolute value. Thus it is that man directs his energies, more or less knowingly, beyond all visible realisation, towards the very source of being and of perfection, when he goes in pursuit of that object to which his life must needs be adjusted in order to gain for it a genuinely moral character.

In every direction, therefore, the examination of the conditions underlying morality leads to the same result. Morality—traditional morality, that is—can, indeed, be established as a system of precepts, can carry weight and make progress, without invoking, explicitly, any principles other than those which are inherent in her. But such principles, reached through abstraction, are really postulates. And if we are anxious to make these postulates appear something more than accidental and worthless facts, we must pass beyond the region of morality strictly so-called, and inquire if there does not exist, for soul-life, some domain still more inward than the conscience of the individual. Morality,

as discipline, possesses self-evolved principles; but principle is not foundation, theory is not reality. On what are the principles of morality based? Where can they find the power needed to establish them as real and living?

III

What are, exactly, those secret dispositions of the mind, which allow it, in observing the world, to discover therein a moral relation, just as the scientist, bringing to the study of phenomena the idea of natural law, is enabled to fashion an object proportioned to his intelligence?

How do we arrive at the affirmation of duty? Not by declaring the invariable connection of one fact with another fact, or of one set of means with a given end. Duty goes beyond finality in the mechanical sense. It is imperative; it decrees: Do this, refrain from that. And if, at this point, we ask—why?—it will undoubtedly be no easy matter to offer a plausible reply. In fact, not one can be found strong enough to carry any

binding conviction to the will. A man who seriously consented to mould his decisions solely in accordance with the data of positive science could always object that sufficient reasons for a moral obligation were not made clear. Duty is not a matter of knowledge, but of belief. It implies a risk, a stake, an affirmation that the most unqualified contradictions of experience can never shake. In other words it implies an act of faith.

Faith does not proceed without an object. Belief means belief in something. The object of moral faith is at once twofold and unique.

Moral faith is directed towards an ideal that is usually designated by the name of Goodness. This ideal is strange, for it appears to be inconsistent with the conditions of action in our world. Goodness, judging by what we see about us, is conditional on wrongdoing. To create is to destroy; and, in order that some men may be unfettered and good, others must, if this our world is allowed to take its own course, be base and servile. The moral ideal presents the astounding paradox that good can and ought to be effected through what is good, and not through what is bad; that the end does not justify

the means ; that the very means are ends ; or rather, that there are neither means nor ends, but that all acts have in themselves an absolute value, and ought to be equally good.

The second object of moral faith is the possible realisation of this paradoxical ideal. Goodness ought not to remain an idea simply, a mere occasion for æsthetic contemplation or mystic rapture : it ought not to scorn existence, under plea of continuing immaculate. It ought to reconcile itself to being, to admit it, to engender it. Would it really be perfection if it were incapable of existing ?

Ideal perfection, necessary existence—that is the object of moral faith : an object double and yet a complete whole, for essence and existence are therein, at one and the same time, distinct and identical. This moral transfiguration of nature neither is nor can be for us a fact of experience. It is, in Plato's words, a noble hope : *ἐλπὶς μεγάλη*, with which we do well to be fascinated : *χρῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ*.

Finally, if morality is to be for us something else than an abstract code, or a discipline that has been laid upon us compulsorily or

by some trick, there must be an inward propensity inclining us in a moral direction. We are bound to assume that man, as Socrates believed, has only to see the good in order to become desirous of it. But mere willing, alone, is not sufficient for our purpose here. Do we not just as fully express our desires in self-will, and in willing what is bad? Before we can wish for something definite we must already participate in it. Union implies reunion. Therefore, desire for the good, in order to be possible, presupposes some instinctive affinity between man and the Ideal. Morality would be foreign to us, and would not be *our* perfection, unless, in our inmost being, we did not long for its truth and its realisation.

And besides, the task involved in morals, viz., fulfilment of the good, cannot be executed by an isolated individual, but demands human collaboration. Now, this collaboration will only be realised in the fullest manner possible through being active, concerted, and based on mutual affection. The impelling force may be organised, adapted to material means, and utilised by the intellect, but it actually proceeds from the heart, *i.e.* from the affec-

tions. If morality is to exist, man must not only believe and hope, but love.

Having reached this point, the question presents itself: what are these underlying dispositions of the soul that morality presupposes? Can we describe them as given kinds of existence, as properties natural to man?

Assuredly, these dispositions are natural, in the sense that they are manifested in nature and are susceptible of being interpreted as empirically observable phenomena. But, so regarded, everything is natural. "The art itself is nature," as Shakespeare tells us. What signifies learning, if, having decided on such a standpoint, we find that nature, in all her manifestations, is self-sufficing and only nature. Elizabeth Browning did not hesitate to say: "Nature is supernatural"; while, to give an earlier reference, Pascal has declared that "man constitutes something infinitely beyond man." In the strict and naturalistic meaning of the word, nature is no more than the totality of things that have been, are, or will be perceptible by the senses. She could not, therefore, under such a definition establish the faith, hope and love which

morality implies. For, taking these ideal elements in the order just given, faith has to do with objects which have no material existence; hope conceives the possible realisation of ends ignored by nature, through means that nature seems to exclude; and love—strong enough to rouse the devotion and self-sacrifice of the individual—is unable to rely, either upon individual instinct which is of central significance in the world, or upon another's right which has no more value than our own. Love can only come from the heights above us.

“ Das Ewig-Weibliche
Zieht uns hinan.”

What is the child's love for its parents, unless it be the echo of the parents' love for their child?

If the word nature be taken in its restricted and scientific meaning, the primary conditions of moral life are *extra-* or *supra-*natural, and correspond to the idea that men, as a rule, frame for themselves when they speak of religion.

Granted that religion has, at all times, exercised the deepest influence upon the life,

the feelings and the actions of men, alike individually and collectively, we may, apparently, ascribe this to the fact that it is an energy or living thing, and not merely a formal and abstract system ; it is related not only to thought but to life. It is, essentially, a motive power, a source of love, of will and of activity. And, if it still continues to be distrusted by science, notwithstanding so many efforts at conciliation, is not that because religion really thrives on elements which science, as such, does not recognise, or is unable to bring within her range of study ?

Now, it is precisely faith, hope and love, as above interpreted, that morality requires. Moral faith is a determination of the will which coincides with duty ; and duty implies a superior object, in whose presence man adopts an attitude of reverence, of awe, of obedience. Moral hope is a determination of the intellect by means of which it is enabled even to conceive that which, in traditional language, is called God, viz., the immediate union of ideal perfection and real existence. And the love that pervades morality is a determination of feeling that surpasses the

purely natural power of the will. We love as we can, not as we wish : so nature pronounces. The obligation of loving, if it is to be accepted as meaning anything, has its source in a power that is higher than nature left to herself.

And, as a matter of fact, if we consider a certain historical phenomenon which is usually deemed a religion, viz., Christianity, we find, set in the first rank, the three faculties that morality presupposes.

“ We walk by faith, not by sight,” said St Paul (2 Corinthians, ch. v., v. 7). Moreover, Jesus himself reprimanded those desiring visible proofs when he declared : “ Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will in no wise believe. . . . Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed ” (St John, ch. iv., v. 48 ; and ch. xx., v. 29).

“ Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done, as in Heaven so on Earth ” : these words are to be read in the prayer that Jesus taught his disciples. Does not this prayer imply that God is essentially the effectual willing of the Good ?

Lastly, the God of the Gospel is love ; and this love, descending into souls that are

disposed towards it, becomes the love of men for one another. "Love," says St John (1 John, ch. iv., v. 7 *sqq.*), "is of God. . . . If we love one another, God abideth in us, and his love is perfected in us."

If morality—real, living, efficacious, and capable of indefinite progress—contains elements which we are compelled to recognise as characteristically religious, it does not follow that it merges entirely in religion. There are in the different religions several elements with which morality properly so-called is not necessarily connected: the particular determinations of dogmas and rites constitute the elements in question. Does this mean that the attitude which befits morality, with regard to these elements, is one indicating mere indifference or even hostility?

Although doctrines and rites are not to be confounded with the essence of religion, they are no less indispensable for rendering religion capable of being apprehended and of being spread among people generally. Undoubtedly, speech is not the same thing as thought or feeling—it only symbolises them: for all that, how great is its influence on

feeling and on thought! If speech crushes us, it is also speech that sets us free. A person whose mind moves slowly, emphasises his words and mistakes them for ideas. A man of active intelligence translates his ideas into speech, in order to check them as they pass, to define them, to sift them, to dispose of them, to make them—under the control of his will—penetrate into the deepest recesses of his mind and become therein living forces. “Think well and remember!” This excellent maxim of Leibnitz can only be realised through the use of words. In the beginning was the word. By means of it the idea began to be and to act.

That is why the positive element of religion forms really an integral part of it; and if, like all language, such positive expression has to be adapted to the degree and to the kind of culture attained by those to whom it is addressed, it resembles language yet again in being necessary to any intelligent person who wishes to live and to act in our world.

Morality has, accordingly, an indirect interest in the positive part of religion. It connects itself therewith, in so far as that part aims at translating the spiritual content

of religion, in the most faithful manner possible, as well as in the language best fitted to gain it a hearing from man as he actually is.

What, then, is the precise relation of morality to religion ?

Religion is the aspiring impulse of man, who, renewed at the fountain-head of existence, conceives a transcendent ideal, and acquires, to help him on his way thither, forces that outstrip nature. It reveals its inner meaning through creating life-patterns, and energies capable of realising them. It is characterised by the teaching that the true process is from duty to power, and not from power to duty. *Nemo ultra posse tenetur*, is the cry of nature as such. What you ought is what you can : that is the good news which religion brings us. The working of religion in a community is expressed in types and examples of perfection that go beyond the given forms. And the principle and propagative method of these modes of existence is the inter-communion of men in God.

Morality is reason's endeavour to formulate, in intellectual terms, such creations of a higher life, and to extract therefrom rules

which shall be applicable to each member of a given community, and even to all men without exception. If religion enjoins perfection, morality bids us aim at universality. "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in Heaven is perfect": that is the teaching of the Gospel. "Act in such a manner that the rule which shapes your own will may serve as the principle of universal control," is Kant's precept.

It cannot be denied that, between ethics and religion, there is some ground for difference. Saintliness can hardly, with any truth, be claimed as belonging to more than a few people; the degree of perfection realisable by the general mass of men has but little chance of being raised. Moreover, it must be admitted, the Churches have always shown a tendency to profess the teaching of a small number of the so-called elect. But morality refuses to regard as genuine perfection a state that is only attained and preserved through avoiding contact with ordinary folk, and through spurning the most essential human tasks—such attitudes being adopted in order to reach a life and destiny in a world

other than our own. Are the terms virtue (*i.e.* moral vigour) and saintliness reconcilable or incompatible? That is the problem.

These two terms are reconcilable if conceived, not in abstract opposition, but in concrete interrelation. Saintliness may signify, not an attempt to escape from nature, but the highest possible identification of nature herself with that ideal which is the mind's noblest inspiration: and, in this way, the ambition of pious souls may be, not to isolate themselves in obscurity, but to join with other souls in united effort over a task which, in reality, can only be achieved through common action.

And, on the other hand, that universal prerogative which morality claims, does not necessarily imply the accommodation of duty to the mediocre capabilities actually possessed by the majority of men. The amount of a man's capacity is not something given: it can only be known after he has acted, and its source is inaccessible. Duty must be determined, not according to the supposed capacity of men, but according to the injunctions of their reason. Thus understood, it implies between men an equality of aim,

but not of actual power, and it by no means excludes inequality of deed. And an essential element of virtue lies in the very attempt to diminish this inequality, and in holding out a hand to the less prosperous.

Religion and morality, far from being mutually exclusive, ought to co-operate. From religion proceed, as from a life-giving and creative principle, those ideal conceptions of human destiny, those generous enthusiasms, those impetuous yearnings after what is unknown, those strong and tireless energies in pursuit of a superhuman perfection, which uplift humanity, and urge it to endless strife with things and with itself. Morality constitutes the reflection of reason on the manifestations of religious enthusiasm, and the determination of practical rules for the purpose of specifying those manifestations which actually prevail among the generality of cultivated men.

The relation which exists between morality and religion cannot be reduced, either to a simple co-existence of fact, or to a conceptual identity or contradiction: it is a flexible and living relation, analogous to those which many thoughtful people are to-day seeking

to define through carefully investigating the idea of solidarity. Morality and religion have a separate existence. In a sense, each of them is a whole : morality can be taught without religion being mentioned ; similarly, religion, in order to bring souls together through communion with God, does not need the abstract rules of morality : life, by itself, is able to communicate life. But, on the other hand, religion creates the material requisite for the critical work of morality ; and morality brings into prominence those aspects of religion which are most calculated to remain fixed in human minds generally.

It has, then, to be admitted that, between these two principles, there is conjunction at the same time as separation. To understand and to define the living and concrete relations which overleap the range of our science and of our logic, is the task of that particular thinking method which we describe as philosophical in the strict sense.

These remarks neither demonstrate, nor tend to demonstrate, that man is constrained, by the nature of things or by his constitution, to adhere to the principles of morality and

of religion. We are able to imagine a man passing through life without fulfilling the destinies, without taking upon himself the duties, that the words religion and morality represent. So far as mere living is concerned, he need only take note of that side of his nature which is properly animal. To fall short of our capacities simply involves a degree of effort that presents no difficulty. And it is clear that to aim at surpassing ourselves is to undertake an adventure, which, notwithstanding all the excellent reasons that can be alleged, remains—to employ Pascal's forcible expression—a wager. But what seems demonstrable is this: in deciding for morality, and not for instinct; in choosing the long-trodden way of a morality at once rational and imperative, rather than a morality which is but the ingenious application of a positive science of manners—in showing such preferences as these, we imply a body of postulates wherein certain essential elements of religion are recognisable.

Does this mean that humanity is bound, some day, to renounce its ethical beliefs, just as it is beginning, in the view of many people, to abandon its religious beliefs?

It is by no means proved that humanity will dispense with religion. We have to look for the realities that lie behind words. Now, at the present day we see human communities taking a deep interest in such enterprises as the following: the realisation, everywhere, of conditions of life that are untrammelled, human and pleasing; the substitution, among the various peoples, of moral right in place of a right that merely signifies rule by the strongest; and, in a general way, the fusion of justice and beneficence, of law and kindness, of solidarity and freedom, of knowledge and love. These objects are nowise forced upon the mind by virtue of experience as barely presented to us. They are the projection, allowing for special world-conditions, of an ideal aspiration, which, in very truth, is grounded in soul-life, and which it is only right to connect with religious feeling. For it would be idle to think that we understand and explain these objects, because we daily repeat the phrases that express them. It is not enough to link words together in order to perceive the relations between things. In seeking after both knowledge and goodness, and in desiring their union, we are

exhibiting an act of faith ; we are venturing to hope for the realisation of a transcendent ideal ; we are illustrating what it is to love.

The deadly conflict, so often assumed to exist between morality and religion, is not, then, even in present intellectual circles, the only conceivable solution of the problem of their relation. Let morality recognise the postulates implied in her ; let her—no longer content with classifying and systematising her logical principles—proceed to reflect on her foundations and on the conditions of her realisation ; let her aspire to be, and not merely to know : and her attitude towards religion will in no sense be one of hostility. Doubtless she will be able to present herself as a distinct discipline, and to profess what is called neutrality. But this neutrality, far from being adopted—openly or surreptitiously—with a view to rendering belief in God absurd, will allow clear access to those soul-channels through which religious beliefs flow. She will not be simply tolerant, after the manner of a man patronising one whom he deems narrow or misguided, and to whom he grants some extension of time in order that his own higher level of wisdom may be

reached ; but she will profess a sincere respect for beliefs, which, in their fundamental significance, she can recognise as helping to bring man nearer to the truth. And this same respect will be greatly strengthened by the sympathy which, according to a never-to-be-forgotten saying, “ everything human ” should rouse within a man’s breast.

On her side, religion, if she remain faithful to her highest traditions, will consist essentially in the free, generous and fruitful life of the spirit ; in the struggle to promote, through the communion of men under divine operation, the coming of the kingdom of God—in other words, the coming of the reign of righteousness and love into the very midst of our world. And the visible and external parts of religion, while they will continue to translate what is divine into the language of men, will be constantly adjusted to the invisible part, and interpreted in accordance with that same adjustment, lest the letter, by reason of the natural law of habit, should be substituted for the spirit.

Then will come, sooner or later, a time when morality and religion, recognising their profound solidarity, will marvel at having been

estranged ; like two persons who, after being led by false appearances to think of one another as enemies, discover, as soon as further acquaintance is reached, that they have been, all the time, in agreement on essential points. It is strange how often it happens that, once our eyes are opened at some particular juncture, we seem to live in another atmosphere, so that we no longer understand why this or that object, this or that person was wont to inspire us with an unconquerable aversion. It is not only in fiction, but yet again in reality, that certain dramas, pregnant with disaster, press on to their final development in a scene of mutual recognition.

III

THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO THE SCIENCES

I

THE question which I have been invited to discuss before you,¹ viz., the relation of Philosophy to the Sciences, is, unless I am mistaken, one that is specially modern, and also real.

Properly speaking, it did not come within the purview of the ancient Greeks. Their fundamental assumption in all natural research was that things, by themselves, were quite incapable of realising any order whatsoever, and that mind was the source of all

¹ The discussions embodied in this treatise originally constituted Professor Émile Boutroux's opening address before the Fourth International Congress of Philosophy, held at Bologna in April 1911. The address was reproduced in the special number of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, July 1911. It has attracted considerable notice in philosophical quarters.—TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

the arrangement and harmony which could be found in them. Πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ· εἶτα ὁ νοῦς ἐλθὼν παντὰ διακόσμησε, said Anaxagoras. Hence, philosophy and the sciences were not essentially distinct. What was called science was the mind which re-discovered and became aware of itself in the laws of nature. Philosophy was the mother of the sciences. The relation between them and it was, at bottom, a relation of identity.

The revival of literature and of art in modern times was not a mere restoration of old doctrines. Such men as Leonardo da Vinci, Francis Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes, framed a conception of science that the Greeks had not expressed with like clearness—the conception of a science of nature which was practically and theoretically autonomous. For a Newton, the facts of experience, and the laws which, in accordance with universal logic, were to be inferred from these facts, formed the entire subject-matter of science.

The science of phenomena, however, had no thought of ousting mind from its old pre-eminence. Whether by reasoning, or by a peculiar experience called inward, mind gave clear proof of its existence ; and the relation

between philosophy and the sciences which was thereafter upheld, if it was no longer the complete identity formerly allowed by the ancient Greeks, was a dualism that admitted, at one and the same time, their compatibility and their radical distinction.

In this way the sciences constituted, by the side of philosophy, an undisputed realm. They did not remain satisfied with it. In spite of the extent and rapidity of scientific progress in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, certain parts of reality, such as life, consciousness, and social phenomena, appeared to elude it. But already Galileo and Descartes had conceived a way of studying things, to which no *a priori* limit could be set. Things appear to us, said Galileo, in the form of sensations; and, in considering them as such, we cannot show their connection and explain them scientifically. But in the book of nature they are written in letters of another alphabet, figuring therein as triangles, squares, circles and spheres. Now, interpreted according to this writing, things are intelligible. Similarly, Descartes expounded what may be called the theory of bias. Assuming that we are given an object

which, as it would seem, cannot be adapted to scientific conditions, there is no cause to forego the task of knowing it scientifically: we have simply to consider it in accordance with a certain bias, which, without blinding us, leads to the application of the scientific standard. This indirect method succeeds with regard to the so-called secondary qualities of matter: sound, heat, light. What right have we to declare *a priori* that this or that object, however different it may appear from those which we find explicable, absolutely shuts out the employment of this method? As a matter of fact, science, in exercising it, takes possession by degrees of life, of sensation, of consciousness, of social phenomena. Should these explanations still be found insufficient, it is of no consequence: in that case, science will seek some more adequate bias, and for her, henceforward, there will no longer remain any inherent mystery in nature.

This attitude of science changes altogether her position in regard to philosophy. Human thought, on which the latter avowedly depends, is for modern science simply one phenomenon among others, a natural manifestation whose intrinsic originality and reality

she can obliterate. And as to the problems that this conception suggests, either they are solvable, and it is for science to solve them, or they overstep the range of science, and no one is justified in looking for their solution.

In view of a science which asserts such claims, philosophy can no longer maintain her position under cover of a mere dualistic compromise. If science proclaims the nonentity of philosophy, is it possible for the latter still to affirm her co-existence in the human mind ?

II

To the question thus raised, a reply has been given by Auguste Comte, which, even to-day, seems fairly adequate. It is unnecessary, according to this reply, to quit the scientific sphere in order to discover the real and legitimate object of philosophical investigation. The sciences, as they are framed by the professional scientists, present to us a multiple and disjointed appearance : the function of philosophy is to determine their true relations and to synthesise them. Philosophy is the synthesis of the sciences.

A simple and elegant definition, but one that is less intelligible when we attempt to make it real than when we are satisfied with formulating it in some preliminary treatise. Already, in the act of realising his scheme, Auguste Comte wavered: it was this indecision that led to the divergence of his expounders with regard to the meaning of his work. Originally he sought to effect the synthesis of the sciences through remaining fixed upon the firm ground of science, and it seemed to him that the constitution of sociology as the master-science would suffice to obtain this result. But soon he became aware that, for the purpose of supplying the content of sociology, the existence of human society was necessary, and that the kind of laws which science had in view could not ensure such a predominance of altruism over egoism as this society implied: the sway of the "religion of humanity," or the preponderance of love over intellect, was essential, if one desired the philosophical synthesis to become, not only a possibility, but a reality.

The difficulty that Auguste Comte encountered, is inherent in the nature of things.

The sciences instinctively seek unification in their own way : in so far as they reach it, the synthesis which they form is nothing else than scientific, and does not show any specifically philosophical character. Seeing that if, deeming this synthesis imperfect, superficial and illusory, the mind endeavours to mould it into one that yields genuine satisfaction, this new synthesis, really philosophical, is no more in the eyes of science than a mystical and arbitrary imagination.

Philosophy, as synthesis of the sciences, either becomes exclusively scientific, and, henceforward, can no longer be permitted the name of philosophy ; or remains philosophical, and, in that case, is anti-scientific.

But cannot philosophy be, in very truth, if not the science of sciences, at least a science analogous to and co-ordinate with the other sciences ? Must we not allow her the same evolution as mathematics, astronomy, physics and physiology, which, originally blended with metaphysics, have by degrees eliminated that foreign element in order to become sciences in the strict meaning of the word ?

The idea of treating philosophy as a positive

science has actually been worked up in brilliant fashion, at the present time, by numerous thinkers. But their investigations seem to have resulted in the complete decomposition of philosophy into a multiplicity of distinct sciences, each of which is more or less autonomous. It is the characteristic of positive science to proceed from facts to principles, and not from principles to facts. Now, viewed from this standpoint, the aims belonging to the different parts of philosophy—psychology, logic, ethics and æsthetics—have appeared widely distinct: so that the expression “scientific philosophy” has little more than a formal value, denoting sciences almost as heterogeneous as mineralogy and botany. In fact, philosophy disappears as a unit: it takes its place in a collection of sciences called philosophical. Philosophy is no longer justifiably represented in language by a substantive, but by an adjective.

Doubtless these special investigations are very legitimate and necessary, and have been very fruitful. But can such sciences, special in their method as in their aim, be rightly called philosophical?

Philosophy has, at all times, implied two

conditions: firstly, the endeavour to view things from a single and universal standpoint, whether or not they can, themselves, be brought to a unity: *σύνοψις* is the term employed by Plato; secondly, the consideration of things in so far as they relate to man. *Τί πρὸς ἡμᾶς*; what is the attitude of the world towards us? How do we figure therein? What part have we to play in it? What are we to look for and infer from it? With what eyes must we gaze upon it? It is such questions as these that the philosopher has put to the universe. If we lay them aside; if we postpone, indefinitely perhaps, both the problem of the unity of things, and that of their meaning from a human standpoint; if we make up our minds to avoid, for good and all, our conceptions of every subjective and human element; if, in a word, we allow only the explanation of man by the world, and reject unreservedly every explanation of the world by man: this means that, instead of bringing philosophy to its state of perfection, we shall abolish it. Either philosophy is, somehow, one and human, or it does not exist.

But perhaps, in order to maintain the

legitimacy of philosophy over against a science which claims to explain all things, there may be some method other than that of elaborating a philosophy which shall itself be conformable to the scientific type. Can we not, giving up to science everything in the nature of explanation, the reduction of this to that, fix ourselves resolutely on the ground of pure experience, and endeavour to show that, like science herself, philosophy aims at unravelling real facts : facts, moreover, which only differ from those which science studies to the extent that they are more primitive, less mingled with explanatory concepts and hypotheses, more strictly conformable to the idea of fact—of immediately given reality ? Philosophy, in this sense, without being exactly a science, since its aim would not be regarded in the same light as that of the sciences, would present, in a high degree, the essential characteristic of every science : belief in fact, in experience. Philosophy would then be an original and immediate experience, while science would be the systematisation of that common experience which is secondary and indirect.

A very tempting definition. But how could

110 THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY

a man obtain this immediate experience which, not being dependent upon any concept, would be anterior to the formation of concepts? What is an intuition in itself without any mingling of concept? Can we, in such an operation, see anything but one half of the real working of the mind—one aspect of experience, artificially isolated from the other, and endowed with an illusory individuality and sufficiency?

Yet again, were we to admit the possibility of such an intuition without concept, should we find any way of escaping Kant's famous dilemma: if a concept without intuition is void, an intuition without concept is blind. Man can only obtain positive knowledge through the union of concept and intuition. Take away every concept and there remains what may be called pure feeling—a real state no doubt, but one that is merely subjective, *i.e.* endowed perhaps, for the individual, with a power of irresistible persuasion, but intellectually worthless in the eyes of other men.

And this very power which feeling claims is indeed more apparent than real. "The imagination," said Leslie Stephen, "lags be-

hind the reason." Still, imagination *does* "lag behind"; and the ideas that we associate with our strongest feelings are, sooner or later, brought into harmony with the totality of our knowledge. One person is inwardly persuaded as to the supernatural action of foreign powers, where another, accustomed to think physiologically, perceives only an organic impulse.

Neither as science, nor as experience, in the scientific meaning of those words, does philosophy make good her claims before modern thought. What, then, has the future in store for her?

A priori, it is impossible to see how the persistence of philosophy can be assured. Is it suggested that the very fact of duration is, in itself, a proof of continuance? How many secular beliefs have disappeared! There are cases in which ancient means respectable, and there are those in which that word stands for old and superannuated. There is nothing to prevent the supposition that philosophy, after having represented a phase of the human mind's development, after having served a useful and glorious

purpose in the progress of this development, will one day be proved useless, even injurious, by the triumph of that very mode of knowledge which she has done so much to prepare and train, viz., Science.

If the adhesion of the human mind to scientific teaching is henceforth assured, and if the existence of science logically excludes that of philosophy, how can philosophy—an affair of reason and logic—preserve an indefinite existence? The one will kill the other: this familiar phrase finds here its application.

III

And yet, it is generally admitted that philosophy is flourishing at the present time; the increasing success of our Congresses is a living proof of this. Moreover, it is not in isolation from the sciences, but in reconciliation and in ever-growing union with them, that philosophy is actually reviving and obtaining new vigour. What does this mean? Are we being duped by a delusion? Is it by some mistake that this Congress is described as philosophical? Is it true that the only

real and fruitful discussions in our midst are certain special ones which resemble those raised in exclusively scientific congresses ?

Before broaching the examination of this question, it behoves us to inquire as to the manner in which such an examination ought to be conducted.

To aim at establishing directly and immediately, after setting aside scientific pretensions, the intrinsic legitimacy of philosophical investigation, would be to employ a purely abstract logic. The wonderful development of the sciences, indeed, has not only disclosed a great many truths which we are bound to take into account : it has produced a frame of mind, an intellectual mould, which must henceforward be identified with our very selves, and which predisposes our judgment of the conceptions that are presented to us. Philosophy can only subsist if she remains in harmony with the thought conditions which science has determined. That is why an examination of the nature and claims of philosophy must in future start from consideration of the sciences, on pain of running counter to the above-mentioned objection of a preliminary question.

114 THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY

But, if we start from consideration of the sciences, does this mean that we shall only hold ourselves justified in thinking according to the categories of the scientific mind as such? If there is no legitimate method of thinking, other than strictly scientific thought, every investigation is useless, the problem is solved beforehand. If we can only think numerically, said Philolaüs, everything is, for us, necessarily number. And, in the same way, if science alone furnishes truth, philosophy, in so far as she claims to differ from science, can only look for error.

Is science, however, our only organ of knowledge? Human life is ever making use of another, which goes by the name of reason. In the practical sphere, particularly, it is clear that we do not decide purely in accordance with our methodically acquired knowledge, but in accordance with a sense of what is true and fitting which, without in the least militating against scientific knowledge, completes it and guides it, according to the immediate requirements of action. Reason is not science. The latter is a totality of notions: the former is a living faculty. The one supplies data, groundwork, material:

the other judges. Judgment implies discrimination, choice, adoption—not through the mechanical application of an external rule, but by means of thinking in accordance with the inexpressible idea of truth. The sciences are obtained through the analysis of phenomena. Reason is formed by reflection both on the sciences and on life.

Do the sciences tend to make reason useless, and to supersede it in the human mind ? Or does reason play, in these very sciences, a necessary part, qualified to justify it alike in the estimation of the scientist and in that of the merely practical man ?

In regarding things after this manner, we shall avoid, not only the vicious circle involved in asking, from the strictly scientific standpoint, if any speculation other than science is legitimate, but also the arbitrariness inseparable from a method which does not start from consideration of the sciences.

We frequently hear science spoken of as a unity. Not, doubtless, that we deem the perfect systematisation of all the special sciences as an accomplished fact. But we assume that nature has, by this time, so

strongly confirmed certain principles furnished at her own suggestion, that we are justified in considering the idea of unity and of universal identity which underlies those principles, as duly established. According to this way of thinking, there is, behind the progress of our sciences, a science which is one and absolute in its own right : a science which, for the philosopher, may constitute the true form of science.

It must be admitted that if, in very truth, all the sciences can rightly claim to be reduced to unity, the legitimacy and interest of such a pursuit as philosophy are very controvertible. For, on the one hand, such a science would actually go far to satisfy that need of unity which is one of the essential marks of philosophical investigation ; while, on the other hand, the absolute unity of science would mean the absolute assimilation of man to things, *i.e.* the annihilation of man as such. There would remain to philosophy scarcely any task but that of asking in which direction error really lies : whether on the side of man, who is conscious of existing, and can only find in himself a measure of existence ; or on the side of science, which abolishes everything that

furnishes, for those who are alive, the condition of existence. Thus we arrive at the strange alternative of being compelled to choose between a knowledge which cannot be applied to existence, and an existence which cannot be an object of knowledge !

But no such situation has actually to be faced. Our science, which is essentially experimental, is neither one, nor aware that it can ever become one. Unity is, for it, not a constitutive principle, but a principle of research : it is a question put to nature. We have not, really, to deal with a science, but with the sciences. More and more jealously these sciences are seeking not only to systematise and to unify knowledge, but to reach reality—to acquire a genuinely objective value. How do they attain such an end ?

If there is one science which appears to be self-sufficing, and to live by pure deduction, it is the science of mathematics. In order to prove that it requires no elements other than concept and reasoning, we should be obliged to expel from it, for good and all, the spectre of the infinite, which seems certainly to be an object, not of pure conception, but of intuition. It is doubtful whether such an effort could

ever completely succeed. A very clever philosophical mathematician, whose recent loss we deplore, Jules Tannery, made a special attempt to reduce the data of mathematics to purely logical elements. At one time he wrote : " The notion of the infinite, of which we need make no mystery in mathematics, amounts to this : after each whole number, there is another." But, later on, he bethought himself that, in the proposition " there is another," the verb " there is," in the present tense, signifies that, with any number whatsoever, the number which follows is not less given than that which precedes ; and so this very definition presupposes a series, at once determinate and infinite, which is an offence against logic. The science of mathematics is something other than any system of propositions, subject to the sole condition of being jointly implied. It has a value not only logical, but objective ; and this value is bound up with certain essences, *i.e.* with certain intuitions which they presuppose.

Similarly, physical science has its own peculiar and indispensable postulates.

If it is true that the most far-reaching physical law, that which governs the con-

crete production of phenomena, is the principle of the dissipation of energy, physical science presupposes the idea of change and of qualitative change, which is only conceived as the product of intuition.

In biology all explanations, all theories imply the notion of adaptation, *i.e.* of change which leads to the preservation of a given individuality; and this notion reveals the necessary part of intuition in that sphere of investigation.

Psychology cannot maintain itself as an objective science, apprehending the special characteristics of the being which it studies, without allowing the intuitive notion of a choice of means, exercised by a unifying activity, called self, with a view to the realisation and development of that very self.

Lastly, sociology, which aims at establishing itself as a distinct science, rests on the idea that, in so far as a collection of individuals forms a society, this collection possesses modes of existence which cannot be inferred from the qualities of individuals, and which are enjoined upon individuals. A society is, with regard to the individuals of whom it is composed, a creation; the notion, therefore,

cannot be explained without the intervention of an intuition.

I remember how our much lamented Jules Tannery began by saying: Common-sense is out of place in mathematics. He meant to convey by this statement that, in all theories of human action, and even in all concrete sciences, we are bound to make room for those notions, gained through contact with reality, which are comprised under the name of common-sense; but that in mathematics we do not require these notions. As a matter of fact such intuitively derived notions are—as Tannery himself allowed eventually—presupposed in mathematics; and the sciences, in so far as they consider objects more concrete and living, need richer and more original intuitions.

We must not confuse objectivity with objectivism. Every kind of knowledge aims at objectivity. But the surest way of reaching it is not always through confining ourselves to the employment of an exclusively objective method. There are cases in which, by adopting in part, even in very large part, the subjective method, we are much more successful in attaining a certain degree of

objectivity. Anybody who wishes to recognise and understand a work of art must, assuredly, give close heed to all the information that learning can furnish. But it is not only a more direct, it is a much surer way for a man to fall back on his intelligence, on his sensibility, on his taste, than to rely on purely objective data. It is the same with the various religions which only reveal their meaning to those who, in some degree, experience religious feeling. And what is true of the mental and moral sciences is applicable even when we come to consider the physical and mathematical sciences. In these cases, also, a certain degree of reliance on the subjective method, *i.e.* on intuition, is the condition of objectivity, of attaining concrete knowledge. Objectivism takes for granted that things, for us, can be literally brought into harmony. Such a view is purely theoretical. We cannot, without compromising their objective value, isolate the tokens of their meaning.

As a matter of fact, then, we have to acknowledge, not a science that is one and universal, but sundry sciences; and each of these sciences implies postulates, which are furnished by intuitions. Science constitutes

an endeavour to diminish indefinitely the part of intuition, and to rest satisfied with inference. But, just as man is obliged to call upon the forces within him in order to replace them, during his labour, by those of nature, so intuition remains necessary to science in order that she may strive to do without it.

Such is human science. It is only self-sufficient through procuring a certain number of postulates, the idea of which is supplied by intuitions.

Now, it is remarkable that, as soon as reason reflects equally on the conditions of action and on those of science, she finds that the postulates of the latter coincide, at bottom, with the postulates of the former.

The first characteristic of human action is to be always seeking for something new. In every course pursued by us, it is a question of producing a phenomenon that shall be something more than the mechanical resultant of pre-existing impulses. Assuredly, man cannot act without imitating, maybe nature, maybe some other man, maybe himself: still, he deems it unworthy of him to keep within the limits of imitation; and, as soon

as he would assert himself as man, he seeks to realise some original invention. And this characteristic implies that man regards himself as standing in front of boundless possibilities. The notion of the infinite is a condition of human action.

In the second place, action springs from a feeling of want, of emptiness—from the sense of a perfection to which we cannot lay claim, and which we do not possess. It results in the consciousness of a better or of a worse welfare. It would no longer offer any interest, it would disappear, if man could only get more in sameness. More property, more wealth, more power, more respect—these things do not constitute merely, in his eyes, a larger collection of like units: they render him conscious of another state, of a qualitative change, of a new value. The feeling experienced by an aeronaut in rising aloft is not that which his machine would have, if it could take note of its working. A second condition of action is, then, the idea of quality, which admits, not only a more and a less, but a change of nature—a *better* or a *worse*.

Action, moreover, is not an end in itself. It is as an individual that man acts; and he

has in view the maintenance of his individuality through the changes which occur in the environment on which he is dependent. A want of harmony between that environment and his own state, causes him pain and annoyance: he endeavours to suppress the ills that come to him in that way; and, from the first, he bows, as much as he can without compromising his very existence, to the conditions in which he finds himself. The preservation of the individual is gained at this cost. It presupposes, indeed, what biology calls adaptation.

That is not all: human action is not only the endeavour of an individual as such. It is intelligent: it is carried out with a view to certain ends which are adopted at the will of the acting subject; it makes use of means which are chosen quite as much on account of the end pursued as on account of the subject's disposition. Human action thus assumes an activity that is synthetic and capable of choice, just as psychological science admits such an activity to be the condition of its own aim.

In short, human action is not shut up within the limits of individual interest, it

has in view the interest of society as something different and more exalted. Yet further : thanks to the reciprocal and constant influence of the individual on society and of society on the individual, man conceives, more and more clearly, superior and ideal ends, towards which he attempts to guide both the social life and the individual life. Human action, lastly, presupposes those very notions of society as a distinct reality, of an ideal duty enjoined alike on society and on individual, with which sociology, if it would be a science of communities that are human and not merely animal, cannot dispense.

In this manner, action, like science, implies postulates ; and these postulates are, at bottom, the same. That which constitutes the very real and profound difference between science and action is this : while science seeks to eliminate intuition, for the mere purpose of preserving law, action tends to swallow up law, in such a way as to realise the richest, most flexible, and freest possible existence.

This kinship between action and science, this common admission of the same postulates

is, for the scientist, a strong incentive in the direction of not despising action, but of regarding it, in a very special sense, as real and compatible with the objects of scientific knowledge; of admitting, in fact, reality and value even in those of its projects or of its modes, that science cannot assimilate to itself.

If, indeed, there existed a faculty of thinking which could, in some way, be taken as the common root of science and of action, should we not be justified in saying that this faculty constituted not only a conceivable and interesting standpoint, but a genuine mode of knowledge, having a certain value, alike in the eyes of the scientist and in the eyes of the average man?

Now, what is called reason is precisely this faculty. The ancient Greeks distinguished reason as mistress of wisdom, *σοφία*, and they understood by that word the harmony of science and of action. According to them, there was a close and reciprocal affinity between the intellect and the will: hence the Socratic paradox of virtue being identical with the science of well-being. In modern times Kant has clearly seen that reason is

not less original and endowed with authority to determine our judgments, as a practical faculty than as a theoretical faculty: but, from his analytical point of view, he regards these two faculties as external the one to the other. This latter standpoint is, it would appear, one that ought to be transcended. We must insist on the artificial character of a distinction between the theoretical function and the practical function belonging to reason. For, that which characterises reason, that which constitutes truly its essence and its value, is its capacity of blending into an indissoluble whole, the conditions of action and those of knowledge. To say that this whole is a synthesis of theory and of practice would be to make use, yet again, of a doubtful metaphor, seeing that a synthesis assumes pre-existing wholes. Common-sense, as Descartes remarked—reason, in the ordinary meaning of the word—is a principle which has more depth in it than such a synthesis: it fundamentally unites our sense of the real and our sense of the intelligible. Indeed, reason grows through feeding both upon scientific knowledge, and upon practical experience. But she represents, in herself, in-

128 THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY

tellec in immediate contact with being, thought secretly one with action.

If reason, thus understood, is justified in the eyes of a reflection which starts from consideration of the positive sciences, the speculations which express the life and the development of that reason are themselves legitimate. Now, these speculations are nothing else than what is called Philosophy.

They are divisible into three categories which may now be briefly indicated.

In the first place, with regard to the sciences, reason analyses their methods—the operations through which they attain vigour and progress, for the purpose of disengaging the human element that they conceal, the living import of their formulæ, and the relation of their certainty to the satisfaction of the mind.

Secondly, as regards art, morality, and religion, reason seeks to discern and to define the bond that connects, with given and visible reality, those three specifically human worlds which depend, not only on external reality, but also on the kind of existence and on the value that pertain to them. Art constitutes a world in which man is thoroughly at home, one that is fashioned with materials

taken from the real and given world to which he shows himself indifferent. In morality we discover an ideal world, constructed by reason with a view to supplying a model for human communities. In religion we have to do with a world which—at once inward and transcendent—is conceived both as supernatural, and as capable of being realised in our visible world.

While, for the man who only knows life and science, these other worlds—unreal in a material sense—are juxtaposed, by the imagination or by the feelings, over against the world of sense in which we find ourselves living, for the philosopher a rational bond between immediate reality and these ideal existences is conceivable.

Lastly, reason can be studied in itself, in its connection with truth and being: it is then more correctly known by the name of metaphysics.

IV

It is in this way that, adopting as its starting-point the study of the sciences and the analysis of their data, philosophy can appear

130 THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY

as autonomous speculation. Its function is to look for the connection between science and action. It responds to the need of knowing whether existence, in so far as it transcends the compass of science, is still within the grasp of the intellect, of the reason, of human thought. It represents man in the act of asking whether in some way he is not, himself, the centre and the harmony of things. Can he not find in himself some perfection that may justifiably be deemed akin to the principle of the universe?

The philosophical way of thinking is not pure intuition, an unrealisable abstraction; it is not, any more, pure reasoning, imprisoned in the world of concepts: it is a dialectic constantly guided by direct communication with the most concrete and the most immediate reality that we are permitted to reach; and it is an intuition which, while it preserves its spontaneity, is illuminated with the widest and deepest knowledge which the human mind has been able to attain. It is the closest possible blending of dialectic and intuition.

Accordingly, if philosophical knowledge does not present that kind of objectivity which is

sufficient for the sciences, and which rests on the artificial construction of an external world with which we can compare our concepts, it is by no means reducible to individual feeling. It strives to apprehend the very foundation of scientific objectivity, and it attests its value by its aptitude for obtaining intellectual adhesion—that which, without doubt, invariably constitutes the final proof of certainty.

If this is philosophy, how, precisely, is it related to the sciences? The question does not admit of that reply, simple and given once for all, which we should like it to furnish. We may, indeed, easily solve it by laying down, beforehand, the definition of those relations which seem to us intelligible, and by trying to discover, afterwards, whether philosophy and the sciences mutually confirm such relations. But a type of relation, thus imposed *a priori*, is only a mental fabrication, and reality is not in any way bound to confine itself thereto. Philosophy and science exist through the attempt to determine, by degrees, relations that are different in kind and deeper than external relations, following, all the

while, actual investigation into the nature of things. There is, said Heraclitus, an invisible harmony: ἁρμονίῃ ἀφανὲς φανερῆς κρείττων. Philosophy is the search after this inner harmony.

Greek philosophy was characterised by the division of relations into three kinds: the relation of identity and of contradiction; the relation of mechanical causality; and the relation of finality.

In the systems of Galileo and of Descartes, science and philosophy clearly expound a new sort of relation: that of the immediate conjunction between two objects irreducible to one another. Assuredly, I can, said Descartes, once in possession of the conjunction—*cogito ergo sum*, present it, thereafter, in syllogistic form through conceiving, as abstract expression of the nexus, the major premiss—*Quiquid cogitat est*, and through making, next, *ergo sum* serve as a conclusion. But this second method, convenient enough for an explanatory purpose, cannot lead to the discovery of conjunctions, seeing that it does nothing but express logically those which already have been discovered; and man, in all his tasks, is

and doubtless always will be in the stage of inquiry.

The philosophical problem which the Cartesian doctrine of the conjunction raised, was that of knowing in what measure a relation between A and B, terms irreducible to one another, could be regarded as rational. The so-called rationalistic school endeavoured to intellectualise that which at first has a purely empirical appearance. Descartes observed that the two terms of certain connections are viewed together, by an intuition of the mind, as one and indivisible: *uno mentis intuitu*. Leibnitz discerned, between two connected terms, a relation of continuity. Kant taught that the connection was a synthesis, constructed by the mind in accordance with its needs and with its laws. Hegel recognised, in the real relations of things, the mind itself, realising progressively that unity—at once concrete and universal—which is its essence.

And even at the present time we find men of action, like the professional philosophers, probing and elaborating the concept of solidarity, in the hope of obtaining, by that means, a profounder and more rational view of social relations.

It is fitting, as Pascal used to say, that the keen mind should try to determine such relations; and of this type are the relations between philosophy and science. In a general way, the transition from science to philosophy is contingent. *Αναγκαιότεραι μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι αὐτῆς*, said Aristotle: turn to whatsoever science you will, it is more necessary than philosophy. It is possible for man to live without thinking: he is sometimes content to forget his manhood. And, since thought is tension, and does not proceed without risk, a certain practical wisdom, as well as the law of least effort, persuades him to dispense readily with philosophical reflection. But Aristotle added: *ἀμείνων δ' οὐδεμία*. If thought is not a necessity, it confers dignity. By thought, by philosophy, man learns to understand things more profoundly, to distinguish more correctly what is of real value, and to seek the means of making reason a power, which shall play its part in the world.

If, then, the relation of philosophy to science is contingent, it is not, on that account, fortuitous and arbitrary. The contingent itself, Leibnitz has said, may have a rational source.

A certain solidarity between science and philosophy is presented to the mind that would not only know, but understand and fashion for itself an ideal. Philosophy is the work of reason, which avails itself of science and of life in order to attain self-realisation.

Is this conception of philosophy, which, in a way, links it with the sciences, incompatible with what the great philosophers have achieved in the past, and does it tend to annul such achievement ?

It would ill accord with the past of philosophy, if we only desired to see, in the history of that past, a series or even a logical sequence of thought-systems, which, adequate in themselves, would constitute a world apart, regulated by a special dialectic.

But need we identify philosophy entirely with philosophical systems ; are these latter nothing else than rigid interpretations, to which the mind has chosen to restrict itself for evermore ?

Philosophy has altered her systems, so we may conclude that she has found herself cramped in them. The speculative reasoning

of most philosophers has undergone evolution, so it cannot have been the slave of its own creations. Human performance, it is true, exists as something apart, and, consequently, critics of the scholarly type have undertaken the task of explaining it by a purely mechanical comparison of texts and of documents. But what constitutes the value, the truth, and the fruitfulness of such systems, is the genius of the particular philosopher whose embodiment they are, and who lives in them. And if, as a matter of fact, this genius is only to be approached through texts, if every attempt to hold direct communication with it, like the attempts made by disembodied spirits, seems illusory, we are, nevertheless, not mistaken if we continue to look for the spirit under the letter, for the living thought under the external form.

The conception of philosophy as the contingent and autonomous development of reason, reflecting on knowledge and on life, has nothing but what is in perfect accord with the existence and with the authority of science. Such a philosophy does not set a closed system in the way of science; that would be to erect an *a priori* science in face

of the experimental science which is alone legitimate in the eyes of those who share our modern outlook. On the one hand, this philosophy is, indeed, other than science, and established in a different manner; on the other hand, always open to the influences of science, it could never contradict or ignore the scientific standpoint.

Not in any degree does it lose its reality and its fruitfulness by adopting this attitude. Said Goethe: "It is the peculiar quality of spirit to furnish, everlastingly, a mental stimulus." *Dies ist die Eigenschaft des Geistes, dass er den Geist ewig anregt.* Philosophy as life may seem less easy to grasp, but it affects men more intimately than philosophy as system.

The philosophy of spirit was, really, the goal toward which the great thinkers directed their efforts.

Plato and Aristotle were innovators who endeavoured to free the mind from the yoke of mechanical necessity, and to secure for it a full and independent life. Descartes made it his chief aim, not to frame a system, but, under the guidance of the sciences and of practical experience, to cultivate his reason.

This is precisely the object that we ought to keep in view. It fully satisfies all our ambitions. Reason is liberal: she knows how to harmonise reverence for the past with care for the rights of the future. She secures to man the preservation of what is best in the legacy of his ancestors; and she protects, in so far as they contain an essential element, our noblest and dearest hopes.

PRINTED BY
TURNBULL AND SPEARS,
EDINBURGH

B
2194
B5 B4

THE LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Santa Barbara
Goleta, California

THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE
STAMPED BELOW.

AVAILABLE FOR
CIRCULATION AFTER

~~DISPLAY PERIOD~~
APR 8 '60

~~JUN 13 1967~~ A

~~NOV 10 '75 10 20~~ 0

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



AA 000 000 554 6

